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INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PRACTICES:
OPENING THE “BLACK BOX” OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS
Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack*
Introduction
Until recently, relatively few international courts existed, and those tri-
bunals decided relatively few cases. Today, international courts and tribu-
nals are flourishing. More than two dozen permanent international courts 
are operational, and over one hundred judicial bodies and mechanisms hear 
international disputes. And these entities are increasingly busy; over 90 per-
cent of the more than 37,000 binding judgments rendered by international 
courts have been issued since the fall of the Berlin Wall.1 Moreover, inter-
national courts increasingly hear disputes involving contentious political, 
economic, and security issues.2 As a result, many scholars view the rise of 
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Yale Law School, the European 
University Institute, the Max Planck Institute (Luxembourg), Oxford University, the Universi-
ty of Toronto, iCourts Center at the University of Copenhagen, Annual Meetings of the Euro-
pean Society of International Law, American Political Science Association, International So-
ciety of Public Law, Law and Society Association, and an American Society of International 
Law Research Forum. We thank participants at these events for thoughtful questions and 
comments. We are particularly grateful to Karen Alter, Eyal Benvenisti, Cosette Creamer, 
Judge Joan Donoghue, Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Andreas Føllesdal, Larry Helfer, Moshe Hirsch, 
Duncan Hollis, Alexandra Huneeus, Mikael Rask Madsen, André Nollkaemper, Anne Peters, 
Yuval Shany, Dinah Shelton, Beth Simmons, Alec Stone Sweet, Geir Ulfstein, Erik Voeten, 
and the editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law for perceptive critiques and use-
ful conversations. We thank Temple University’s Office of the Provost for providing financial 
support that enabled us to conduct interviews of current and former judges of international 
courts, court officials, and attorneys who practice before international tribunals. We are par-
ticularly grateful to our interviewees, to whom we promised anonymity, for generously shar-
ing their thoughts and insights, and to Cassandra Emmons for invaluable research assistance.
1. KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS 4 (2014).
2. See, e.g., Zakharov v. Russia, 2015-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 205 (judgment of the Grand 
Chamber finding unlawful Russian surveillance law permitting interception of phone commu-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-95-5/18-T, Judgment 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2016) (convicting former Bosnian Serb 
leader of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity); South China Sea Arbitration, 
PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award (July 12, 2016), https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/
175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf (rejecting China’s claim of “historic rights” to 
resources in the South China Sea).
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international adjudication as one of the most important developments in in-
ternational affairs in recent decades.3
The dramatic upswing in the number and use of international courts has 
attracted scholars eager to systematize and understand the role of these bod-
ies in contemporary international affairs. International law (“IL”) scholars 
approach these questions from a variety of perspectives and explore, inter 
alia, the interpretative strategies and jurisprudence of various courts, diverse 
jurisdictional and procedural matters, and the law-making function of inter-
national tribunals.4 International relations (“IR”) scholars generally focus on 
international courts’ relations with states and other actors in their political 
environment, seeking to establish correlations between inputs (such as the 
identity and relative power of the parties, or the backgrounds of the judges) 
and outputs (who wins, who loses), with important literatures exploring ju-
dicial independence and institutional design.5 More recently, scholars from 
both disciplines have pursued common issues, such as inquiries into the le-
gitimacy and effectiveness of courts and the professional backgrounds of 
those who serve on these tribunals.6
More importantly, however, both literatures share an important blind 
spot. Specifically—and surprisingly—they demonstrate little interest in ex-
ploring how international courts actually function. Scholars rarely study the 
internal, day-to-day workings of courts, such as their decision-making prac-
tices, including processes of judicial deliberation; the practices that shape 
how opinions are drafted, revised, and translated; or the practices that in-
form the complex relationships between judges, on the one hand, and mem-
bers of registries and other court officials, on the other. In sum, despite gen-
erating substantial advances in our knowledge regarding the outputs of 
international tribunals, both IL and IR scholars have largely neglected the 
inner workings of the courts themselves and, in particular, have not ex-
plored the everyday practices and social relationships through which inter-
national judicial decisions are produced.
3. Robert O. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transna-
tional, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 457 (2000).
4. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAWMAKING: ON PUBLIC AUTHORITY AND 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo 
Venzke eds., 2012); THE RULES, PRACTICE AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012).
5. Erik Voeten, International Judicial Independence, in INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 421 (Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, eds., 2013) [hereinafter Dunoff & Pollack, INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES]; LESLIE JOHNS, STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COURTS: THE HIDDEN 
COSTS OF LEGALIZATION (2015). 
6. See, e.g., Leigh Swigart & Daniel Terris, Who are International Judges?, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 619 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. 
eds., 2013) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]; Shashank P. Kumar & Cecily Rose, A Study of 
Lawyers Appearing before the International Court of Justice, 1999–2012, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L.
893 (2014).
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This remarkable oversight results from another feature common to 
scholarship in both disciplines. In particular, the dominant methodological 
approaches in mainstream IL and IR scholarship conceptualize international 
courts as unitary actors whose interests and strategies are best understood by 
examining judicial decisions.7 This approach has the unintended effect of 
rendering courts’ inner workings outside the scope of mainstream scholarly 
inquiry.
This paper is a call to shift scholarly approaches to the study of interna-
tional courts. In particular, it is time for scholars to open up the “black box” 
of international tribunals by studying what international judges do and how 
they do it. As a first step in this process, this article represents a preliminary 
effort to identify and examine the everyday practices of international judges, 
with particular focus on practices associated with judicial decision-making. 
To do so, we draw selectively upon a large literature on “practice theory” 
that has been influential across the social sciences,8 but that has, with few 
exceptions, not been applied to international law in general9 or to interna-
tional courts in particular.10 As we discuss more fully below, practice theory 
“focuses on the everyday, highlighting embodied capacities such as know-
how, skills and tacit understandings, i.e., shared social practices.”11 This ap-
proach provides a conceptual framework and a set of analytic tools that ena-
ble scholars to identify patterns of judicial behavior that have heretofore es-
caped scholarly notice.
The most immediate benefit of focusing on judicial practices is the 
opening of a wide range of otherwise hidden activities that illuminate inter-
national tribunals’ inner workings and decision-making processes. Given 
the increasing judicialization of international affairs, we believe that the de-
scriptive task of excavating these judicial practices is important in its own 
right. The study of judicial practices, however, lends itself to a variety of 
uses by scholars with diverse aims beyond that of richer and more accurate 
descriptions. For example, practice theory provides a pathway toward un-
7. Recent works that expand our understanding of international courts, but neverthe-
less treat courts as unitary actors and “black-box” their internal workings include ALTER, su-
pra note 1 and most of the essays in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., THE PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY (Theodore Schatzki et 
al. eds., 2001).
9. Notable exceptions, discussed below, include JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J.
TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL 
ACCOUNT (2010); Tanja E. Aalberts & Ingo Venzke, Moving Beyond Interdisciplinary Turf 
Wars: Towards an Understanding of International Law as Practice, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS A PROFESSION 287 (Jean d’Aspremont et al. eds., 2017).
10. An important exception, discussed below, is Symposium, The Practices of the In-
ternational Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2013) [hereinafter ICC Symposi-
um]. 
11. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Why International Relations Theory Needs Bourdieu, E-
INT’L REL. (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/23/why-international-relations-
theory-needs-bourdieu/.
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covering the subjective understandings that international judges attach to 
their own behaviors and actions that will be of interest to interpretivist 
scholars, as well as those who emphasize the socially constructed nature of 
meaning and knowledge. For these individuals, the turn to practice promises 
a rich set of insights into judicial understandings not readily available 
through more conventional approaches.
Moreover, for positivist scholars seeking to explain judicial outcomes, 
the study of practices promises to reveal underlying causal processes and 
mechanisms that influence judicial decisions. Although practice theory in 
international relations has thus far taken a primarily interpretivist approach, 
our research suggests that international judicial practices have systematic 
impacts on judicial outputs, and we propose to expand conventional uses of 
a practice approach to include a positivist research agenda for the study of 
the causes and consequences of various judicial practices.12
Finally, the application of practice theory to international courts would 
bring an important collateral benefit. The study of international courts rep-
resents an area where IL and IR scholars engage in largely complementary 
endeavors, yet where a truly interdisciplinary research agenda has yet to 
emerge. We have argued that the gaps between IL and IR writings reflect, in 
part, different goals and aims in scholarship, and, in part, different ontologi-
cal and epistemological commitments associated with different disciplinary 
traditions.13 Notably, however, a practice approach is relatively agnostic re-
garding many of the specific epistemological or ontological commitments 
that divide other approaches to the study of the international legal order.14
Thus, a practice approach can sidestep many of the thorny methodological 
issues that have stymied interdisciplinary efforts in the past. For this reason, 
use of practice theory can facilitate productive inter-disciplinary and inter-
paradigmatic dialogue.
The remainder of this paper proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a 
brief introduction to practice theory, with particular attention to the writings 
of Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, whose work strongly influenced 
subsequent IR scholarship.15 We then review the limited use of practice the-
ory to study international legal phenomena. As we explain, these writings 
do not analyze the practices of international courts and tribunals, with the 
one notable exception of a project analyzing the workings of the Interna-
12. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Shape of Judgment (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with authors). 
13. Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, International Law and International Rela-
tions: Introducing an Interdisciplinary Dialogue, in DUNOFF & POLLACK,
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 3.
14. Emanuel Adler & Vincent Pouliot, International Practices, 3 INT’L THEORY 1, 14–
16 (2011) [hereinafter International Practices].
15. See, e.g., id.; INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES (Emanuel Adler & Vincent Pouliot eds., 
2011) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES]. 
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tional Criminal Court (“ICC”).16 While useful, this project highlights many 
practices that are unique to international criminal tribunals,17 and the contri-
butions to this project do not undertake comparative analysis. We believe, in 
contrast, that it is precisely in comparative contexts that practice theory can 
be of particular use, and we demonstrate this claim below.
Having surveyed leading approaches to practice theory and differentiat-
ed our approach from previous efforts in Part I, we proceed in Part II to an 
examination of international judicial practices. We argue that international 
judicial practices, like other practices, are related to both legal structures 
and individual agents, but reducible to neither. We then provide a synoptic 
overview of international judicial practices. We divide these practices into 
two broad categories—those not directly related to the litigation process, 
and those directly related to the litigation process—and describe a number 
of practices in each category. In virtually every area of practice that we ex-
amine, we see substantial, even dramatic, variation across courts.
The study of international judicial practices raises difficult methodolog-
ical issues, which we explore in Part III. Many of the practices we highlight 
are not directly accessible. For example, judicial deliberations occur behind 
closed doors, and international judges are bound by a duty of confidentiality 
not to reveal the content of these deliberations. Given the particular difficul-
ties of accessing judicial practices, we adopt a multi-method approach, 
drawing on a combination of interviews with current and former interna-
tional judges, current and former court officials, and lawyers who appear 
before international tribunals; archival research into drafting histories of the 
statutes of various courts; extensive review of international judges’ off-the-
bench writings and speeches; and secondary literature on the court in ques-
tion.
In Part IV, we report on our own multi-method investigation into the 
use, or non-use, of separate concurring and dissenting opinions at various 
international courts. While separate opinions are quite common at some in-
ternational tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), In-
ternational Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”), and European Court 
of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), other international courts, such as the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), never issue concurring or dis-
senting opinions. At still other tribunals, such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s (“WTO”) Appellate Body, separate opinions are rare but not unheard 
of. While a complete analysis of dissent practices at all these courts is be-
yond the scope of this paper, we illustrate the promise of a practice ap-
proach through an empirical analysis of dissent practices at two leading tri-
bunals, the CJEU and ECHR, focusing not only on their material behavior 
16. ICC Symposium, supra note 10.
17. Karim A.A. Kahn & Anand A. Shah, Defensive Practices: Representing Clients 
Before the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191 (2013); Alex 
Whiting, Dynamic Investigative Practice at the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 163 (2013).
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(the issuing or non-issuing of separate opinions) but also on the intersubjec-
tively shared norms and subjective motivations of judges in each court. A 
brief conclusion follows.
Taken as a whole, this Article—and the larger project of which it is 
part—represents a call for a new, third generation of scholarship on interna-
tional courts and tribunals. First-generation writings “focused primarily on 
legal documents and single-institution studies,” “described in formal terms 
how new adjudicative bodies were supposed to operate”—as opposed to 
how they actually operate—and were rooted in a single disciplinary ap-
proach.18 An emerging second generation of scholarship has moved from 
approaching each court as “sui generis, unique and isolated” to comparative 
studies of multiple adjudicative mechanisms.19 Second-generation scholar-
ship often draws on inter- and cross-disciplinary perspectives, with particu-
lar focus on quantitative research. We endorse these moves, yet by way of 
example seek to build on and extend these earlier works by adopting an ap-
proach that can open up the black box of international courts and tribunals, 
shed light on their actual operations and workings (i.e., their practices), and 
thereby enrich our understanding of these increasingly important bodies.
I. An Introduction to Practice Theory
As practice theory is not frequently employed in the analysis of interna-
tional legal phenomena, we begin with a brief introduction to “the practice 
turn” in social theory. Our discussion proceeds in three parts. First, we situ-
ate practice theory within larger currents of social thought. Next, we review 
the use of practice theory in the international relations literature and the 
analysis of international legal phenomena. Finally, we explain how our ap-
proach draws from and extends previous efforts.
A. What is Practice Theory?
Broadly speaking, contemporary social theory can be understood as 
consisting of three broad research traditions: rationalism, norm-based theo-
rizing, and cultural theory (including practice theory).20For current purposes, 
these theories can be usefully distinguished by reference to their approaches 
to human action, or agency, and social order, or structure. Rationalist theo-
ries conceptualize individuals as self-interested actors with exogenously 
given preferences, whose behavior is guided by instrumental rationality. Ra-
tionalist approaches thus explain human action as the result of individual 
18. Cesare Romano et al., Editors’ Preface to OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 
viii.
19. Id.
20. We draw this typology from Christian Bueger & Frank Gadinger, The Play of In-
ternational Practice, 59 INT’L STUD. Q. 449 (2015); Andreas Reckwitz, Toward a Theory of 
Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing, 5 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 243 
(2002). 
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purposes, intentions, and interests and view social structures as reflecting 
the aggregated actions of individual agents.
Norm-oriented theories, in contrast, focus on underlying norms that 
create the conditions for action in the first place. From this perspective, hu-
man activity is best understood as reflecting widely shared social norms, 
considered in light of an individual’s identity and context. Focusing largely 
on how social norms channel human action, these approaches often suggest
the ontological priority of structures over agents.
These two competing perspectives have been challenged more recently 
by a third approach, which has roots in the “culturalist revolution” in 20th
century social philosophy.21 Cultural theories, which find roots in a diverse 
set of writers including Bourdieu, Foucault, Giddens, and Lévi-Strauss,22
offer yet a third way “of explaining and understanding action, namely by 
having recourse to symbolic structures of meaning.”23 That is, to understand 
and explain human action, cultural theories focus on “the symbolic struc-
tures of knowledge which enable and constrain the agents to interpret the 
world according to certain forms, and to behave in corresponding ways.”24
Cultural theories emphasize the “the implicit, tacit or unconscious layer of 
knowledge which enables a symbolic organization of reality.”25
Cultural theories come in many varieties, with practice theory being one 
subtype. Moreover, the term “practice theory” itself captures a diverse set of 
thinkers and approaches and is used more as an umbrella term than as a la-
bel that identifies a narrowly circumscribed theoretical approach. For this 
reason, practice theory as such does not provide a prescribed theoretical 
framework that can be transposed to specific empirical cases for empirical 
testing and validation.
Despite their theoretical diversity, however, all practice approaches 
“put[] social practice—as an actual, contingent, evolving and productive set 
of activities—cent[er] stage.”26 As one useful discussion explains:
[P]ractice connotes doing, but not just doing in and of itself. It is 
doing in a historical and social context that gives structure and 
meaning to what we do. In this sense, practice is always social 
21. Reckwitz, supra note 20, at 245. 
22. For foundational writings in this tradition, see generally PIERRE BOURDIEU,
OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1977); MICHEL FOUCAULT, L’ARCHÉOLOGIE DU 
SAVOIR (1969); ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL THEORY: ACTION,
STRUCTURE, AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1979); CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS,
THE SAVAGE MIND (1962).
23. Reckwitz, supra note 20, at 244.
24. Id. at 245–46.
25. Id. at 246.
26. Nikolas M. Rajkovic et al., Introduction to THE POWER OF LEGALITY: PRACTICES 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR POLITICS 1, 12 (Nikolas M. Rajkovic et al. eds., 2016); 
see also DAVIDE NICOLINI, PRACTICE THEORY, WORK AND ORGANIZATION: AN
INTRODUCTION 219 (2012).
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practice. Such a concept of practice includes both the explicit and 
the tacit. It includes what is said and what is left unsaid; what is 
represented and what is assumed. It includes the language, tools, 
documents, . . . regulations, and contracts that various practices 
make explicit for a variety of purposes.27
By foregrounding practices as the central unit of social life, these ap-
proaches attempt to overcome several of the classic dualisms that have re-
ceived substantial attention in social theory, including those between agency
and structure, ideational and material phenomena, and continuity and 
change.
Starting with agency and structure, most practice approaches elide the 
question of whether agents or structure are ontologically prior and “restor[e] 
the actor to the social process without losing sight of the larger structures 
that constrain (but also enable) social action.”28 Indeed, practice theorists 
seek to overcome the agency-structure divide by rethinking both concepts in 
relation to the practices in which agency and structure meet. In this view, 
social structures—ranging from families to governmental organizations to 
professional fields—”are all kept in existence through the recurrent perfor-
mance of material activities, and to a large extent, they only exist as long as 
those activities are performed.”29 Structures, therefore, are decentered and 
made contingent on their underlying practices. Agency is similarly decen-
tered and related to practice. “While homo economicus is conceived as a 
(semi) rational decision maker and homo sociologicus is depicted as a norm-
following, role-performing individual, homo practicus is conceived as a car-
rier of practices, a body/mind who ‘carries,’ but also ‘carries out,’ social 
practices.”30
In a similar fashion, practice theory also seeks to reconcile another clas-
sic dualism in social theory, between the ideational and the material, i.e., 
ideational or discursive phenomena on the one hand and material phenome-
na on the other. As we shall see below, knowledge (sometimes called back-
ground knowledge) is central to practice theory, and actions become prac-
tices—rather than merely physical activity or behavior—through the shared 
knowledge that practitioners use to imbue their actions with meaning. At the 
same time, however, the practice-theoretical conception of knowledge is not 
purely abstract, but defined (at least in part) in relation to practice. “From a 
practice perspective, knowledge is conceived largely as a form of mastery 
that is expressed in the capacity to carry out a social and material activity.”31
27. ETIENNE WEGNER, COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE: LEARNING, MEANING, AND 
IDENTITY 47 (1998). 
28. SHERRY B. ORTNER, ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: CULTURE, POWER 
AND THE ACTING SUBJECT 3 (2006).
29. NICOLINI, supra note 26, at 3.  
30. Id. at 4 (citing Reckwitz, supra note 20, at 256).
31. NICOLINI, supra note 26, at 5. 
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Practices, in other words, are never purely discursive but also material and 
embodied and must be studied accordingly, with due attention paid both to 
bodies and objects as well as to discourse and texts.
A final dichotomy that practice theory arguably attempts to overcome is 
continuity and change. Like many norm-oriented and cultural theories, prac-
tice theories often focus on the ways in which, and the individuals through 
which, existing practices are reproduced over time through socialization, 
learning, and repetition. In this sense, practice theory seems to emphasize 
continuity. Yet practice theories also allow for change, as individual actors 
can and do contest practices that are themselves infused with, and tend to 
reproduce, certain distributions of power. In this view:
[Practices] literally put people (and things) in place, and they give 
(or deny) people the power to do things and to think of themselves 
in certain ways. As a result, practices . . . produce and reproduce 
differences and inequalities. . . . Practices are thus always neces-
sarily open to contestation and this keeps them continuously in a 
state of tension and change.32
Hence, practice theories, while sometimes perceived to focus on the repro-
duction of unchanging social practices, are in fact highly attentive to the re-
alities of power that infuse social relations and provide for endogenous 
sources of contestation and change.
B. Practice Theory’s Path to International Law
1. The Practice Turn in IR
By the early 2000s, IR scholars discovered practice theory, with Eman-
uel Adler and Vincent Pouliot’s work being among the most influential in 
popularizing use of practice theory in the study of international relations.33
In Adler and Pouliot’s conceptualization, “[p]ractices are competent per-
formances. More precisely, practices are socially meaningful patterns of ac-
tion which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously 
embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in 
and on the material world.”34
From this point of departure, Adler and Pouliot foreground five critical 
dimensions of practice. First, and most fundamentally, “a practice is a per-
formance . . . , that is, a process of doing.”35 Second, they argue:
32. Id. at 6. 
33. See sources cited supra notes 14–15.
34. International Practices, supra note 14, at 4; see also Emanuel Adler & Vincent 
Pouliot, International Practices: Introduction and Framework, in INTERNATIONAL 
PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 3, 6 [hereinafter Introduction and Framework].
35. International Practices, supra note 14, at 6 (emphasis in original).
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[P]ractice tends to be patterned, in that it generally exhibits certain 
regularities over time and space. . . . These patterns . . . are part of a 
socially organized context, which not only gives them meaning, but 
also structures interaction. This is not to say that practice is strictly 
iterative, however, as there is always wiggle room for agency even 
in repetition . . . .36
Third, “practice is more or less competent in a socially meaningful and rec-
ognizable way,” as assessed by audiences who possess a set of shared 
standards.37 Fourth, “practice rests on background knowledge,” which is in-
tersubjective and practice-oriented rather than abstract or theoretical.38 Fifth 
and finally, “practice weaves together the discursive and material worlds,” 
featuring a linguistic element that gives practices their meaning, and a mate-
rial element, as practices act in and upon the world.39
As an illustration of these five elements, Adler and Pouliot offer the ex-
ample of international summitry, such as the annual G8 (now G7) summit 
meetings:
These meetings of state officials constitute an international practice 
insofar as they conform to the five dimensions that we have just 
laid out. First, G8 summits are performances: they consist of a 
number of actions and processes that unfold in real time. . . . Sec-
ond, these performances are patterned from one year to the 
next. . . . Third, participating state officials generally exhibit a vari-
able degree of competence as they attend the summit. . . . Fourth, 
much of the performance rests on a form of background knowledge 
that is bound up in practices. . . . Fifth and finally, G8 summits are 
both ideational and material. Participants spend a lot of their time 
publicly and privately talking about their meetings in order to rep-
resent preferences and policies. To do so, they make use of a varie-
ty of materials–conference rooms, ceremonial artifacts, the Internet, 
note exchanges with Sherpas, etc.40
As this example suggests, international diplomacy has been a central focus 
of practice-based analysis in IR scholarship.41 Practice-theoretical studies 
differ from more traditional studies of diplomacy, which often highlight the 
pursuit of state interests, underlying power asymmetries, or the characteris-
36. Id. (emphasis in original).
37. Id. at 6–7 (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 7–8.
41. See IVER B. NEUMANN, AT HOME WITH THE DIPLOMATS: INSIDE A EUROPEAN 
FOREIGN MINISTRY (2012); VINCENT POULIOT, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN PRACTICE:
THE POLITICS OF NATO–RUSSIA DIPLOMACY (2010); Ole Jacob Sending et al., The Future of 
Diplomacy: Changing Practices, Evolving Relationships, 66 INT’L J. 527 (2011) (special issue 
on diplomacy as a practice).
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tics of successful bargaining strategies in their goal of illuminating “what 
practitioners actually do when they interact on the diplomatic floor.”42 The 
practice approach, in various guises, has been adopted by IR scholars to 
analyze European security,43 the early Cold War,44 international organiza-
tions,45 and humanitarian intervention,46 among other issue areas.
2. Practice Theory and International Law
As noted, the use of practice theory to analyze international law has, to 
date, been relatively rare.47 Perhaps the first use of practice theory to ana-
lyze international law is found in the joint work of international lawyer Jutta 
Brunnée and political scientist Stephen Toope. In a series of writings, these 
authors draw upon the legal theory of Lon Fuller and practice-oriented con-
structivist approaches to identify and explore an “interactional theory of in-
ternational law” that centers upon the “practice of legality.”48 Other scholars 
subsequently explored the “practice of legality” in the context of interna-
tional law, and a much smaller number applied practice theory to interna-
tional courts. We explore each of these moves in the literature in turn.
In Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Ac-
count, Brunnée and Toope explore what distinguishes legal norms—and, we 
might add, legal practices—from other social norms and practices. In con-
trast to approaches that emphasize law’s form or pedigree, Brunnée and 
Toope argue that law’s distinctiveness consists in adherence to specific cri-
teria of legality.49 In particular, norms are distinctively legal when they sat-
isfy eight criteria identified by Lon Fuller: generality, promulgation, non-
42. POULIOT, supra note 41, at 5.
43. Trine Villumsen Berling, Bourdieu, International Relations, and European Securi-
ty, 41 THEORY & SOC’Y 451 (2012).
44. TED HOPF, RECONSTRUCTING THE COLD WAR: THE EARLY YEARS, 1945–1958
(2012).
45. Sebastian Schindler, Man versus State: Contested Agency in the United Nations, 43 
MILLENNIUM 3 (2014).
46. Rebecca Adler-Nissen & Vincent Pouliot, Power in Practice: Negotiating the In-
ternational Intervention in Libya, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 889 (2014).
47. A Westlaw search of (Adler w/5 Pouliot) and “international practices” in the Law 
Reviews and Journals database performed on May 28, 2018 generated a grand total of nine 
hits. This period of underutilization may be near its end, however, as a number of recent pro-
jects make use of this approach. See, e.g., THE CHANGING PRACTICES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Tanja Aalberts & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen eds., 2018); THE POWER OF LEGALITY:
PRACTICES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEIR POLITICS, supra note 26.
48. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Interactional International Law and the Prac-
tice of Legality, in INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 108 [hereinafter Interac-
tional International Law]; JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND 
LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (2010) [hereinafter
LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY].
49. LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY, supra note 48, at 351.
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retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction, not asking the impossible, constan-
cy, and congruence between rules and official action.50
Significantly, Brunnée and Toope argue that “law’s influence is not ex-
plained simply by identifying social norms that meet the criteria of legali-
ty.”51 Rather, they argue, legal norms are built, maintained, and evolve 
through a “robust practice of legality” undertaken by “communities of prac-
tice.” These communities of practice—a phrase and concept drawn from 
practice theory—consist of individuals who, through engagement in a 
shared domain, develop a shared repertoire of resources, including cases, 
stories, tools, vocabularies, and ways of addressing recurring problems—in 
short, practices. Thus, for Brunnée and Toope, “[p]ractice resides in a com-
munity of people and the relations of mutual engagement by which they can 
do whatever they do.”52 Similarly, communities of practice provide the set-
tings in which “the knowledge or norms that shape actors’ understandings 
of the world are generated and practices evolve.”53 Indeed, for Brunnée and 
Toope, it is precisely the ongoing, day-to-day practice of legality in com-
munities of practice, and not simply the formal source of law, that deter-
mines whether a given norm generates a sense of legal obligation or falls 
into desuetude.54
Brunnée and Toope’s work represents a groundbreaking effort to apply 
practice theory to international law and opened the door to later efforts to 
examine the practice of legality as it relates to international law.55 One re-
cent notable effort along these lines is a contribution by political scientist 
Tanya Aalberts and international legal scholar Ingo Venzke.56 Starting from 
the observation that international law “is an activity, not a thing,” Aalberts 
and Venzke argue that “international law [is] a separate field established 
through its professional practices and modes of reasoning, rather than 
50. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
51. Interactional International Law, supra note 48, at 109.
52. LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY, supra note 48, at 63 (quoting WEGNER, note 27, at 
73).
53. Id. at 63.
54. Interactional International Law, supra note 48, at 109.
55. A related but distinguishable body of work by Yves Dezalay and collaborators de-
velops sophisticated sociological accounts of various aspects of international legal practice, 
although without using the vocabularies and conceptual frameworks associated with practice 
theory. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO 
TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 2002); 
Yves Dezalay & Mikael Rask Madsen, The Force of Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and 
the Reflexive Sociology of Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433 (2012); Guillaume Sacriste & 
Antoine Vauchez, The Force of International Law: Lawyers’ Diplomacy on the International 
Scene in the 1920s, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 83 (2007).
56. Aalberts & Venzke, supra note 9, at 287.
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through law as a body of rules[.] . . . These practices constitute both the pro-
fessionals and international law as a particular field of (argumentative) prac-
tice.”57 As an argumentative practice, they continue, international law “con-
tains within itself the yardstick of what counts as a valid argument or, put 
differently, ‘competent performance’.”58
While the works surveyed above draw upon practice theory to analyze 
international law and international legal obligation, they do not discuss the 
practices of international courts. Others, however, have taken this step. In 
particular, Jens Meierhenrich and his colleagues undertook a close examina-
tion of the specific practices engaged in and around the ICC.59 In this pro-
ject, Meierhenrich defines practices as “recurrent and meaningful work ac-
tivities—social or material—that are performed in a regularized fashion and 
that have a bearing, whether large or small, on the operation of the ICC.”60
The project contributors focus not only on the practices of ICC judges, but 
also on those of other ICC organs (including the Registry and the Office of 
the Prosecutor), interstate negotiators, lawyers representing the defendants 
before the court, and other members of the broader international criminal 
law community. Both individually and in the aggregate, these papers pro-
vide a fine-grained analysis that illuminates previously unexplored aspects 
of the ICC’s operations and substantially enrich our understanding of “the 
daily grind of investigating, prosecuting, defending, adjudicating, and ad-
ministering those who stand accused of having perpetrated the most serious 
of international crimes.”61
We seek to build upon and extend these pioneering works in several re-
spects. First, unlike most previous writings that apply practice theory to in-
ternational law, we situate judicial practices at various international courts 
at the center of the analysis. As demonstrated in Part II, infra, international 
tribunals provide a particularly rich environment for those interested in the 
study of practices. Second, and relatedly, we depart from the scholars dis-
cussed above with respect to the “level of aggregation,” or level of abstrac-
tion, at which we identify specific practices. In particular, our examination 
57. Id. at 290, 305. Similar claims regarding international law as an argumentative 
practice have been advanced by others. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Methodology of Inter-
national Law, in 7 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 124, 124 
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012).
58. Aalberts & Venzke, supra note 9, at 307 (quoting Introduction and Framework,
supra note 34, at 3). 
59. ICC Symposium, supra note 10.
60. Jens Meierhenrich, Foreword: The Practices of the International Criminal Court,
76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, i (2013). Subsequent work has focused on other practices at 
international criminal tribunals, including opening statements by prosecutors, see Sofia Stolk, 
‘The Record on Which History Will Judge Us Tomorrow’: Auto-History in the Opening 
Statements of International Criminal Tribunals, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 993 (2015), and cita-
tion practices. See Nora Stappert, A New Influence of Legal Scholars? The Use of Academic 
Writings at International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 31 LEIDEN J INT’L L. 963 (2018).
61. Meierhenrich, supra note 60, at iii.
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of judicial practices across international tribunals represents a via media be-
tween more abstract conceptualizations of the entirety of international law 
as a practice and a more particularized study of practices at one specific 
court. Let us briefly elaborate each of these points.
International Courts and Judges. Brunnée and Toope performed the 
important service of introducing practice theory to international legal schol-
arship, yet their work contains a notable gap. Specifically, international 
courts are virtually absent from their analysis. Thus, Legitimacy and Legali-
ty contains detailed case studies of climate change negotiations; disputes 
over the legality of U.S. interrogation techniques employed after 9/11; and 
debates over the use of force, with particular attention devoted to the second 
Gulf War. In each case, many actors and events receive attention, ranging 
from diplomatic conferences to street demonstrations to the TV show 24.
However, none of Brunnée and Toope’s detailed case studies discuss the 
role of international tribunals. To be sure, international courts have not been 
at the center of debates over climate change and were not at the center of 
debates over the legality of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Yet, by focus-
ing on these specific case studies, Brunnée and Toope elide a wide range of 
other issue areas in which international courts and judges play central roles.
In one sense, the Aalberts and Venzke paper starts conceptually where 
Brunnée and Toope’s work ends. It focuses not on the genesis or mainte-
nance of legal norms, but rather on legal interpretation and argumentation. 
Given this shift in focus, and given that courts are a highly visible site for 
legal interpretation and argumentation, one might expect international tribu-
nals to feature prominently in the analysis. However, the Aalberts and 
Venzke paper does not mention international courts and tribunals.62 Our fo-
cus on international judicial practices thus complements and extends Brunée 
and Toope’s and Aalberts and Venzke’s research into a previously unex-
plored domain.
Shifting the Level of Aggregation. Our work also diverges from previ-
ous writings in that our interest in international judicial practices reflects a 
different level of aggregation, or level of abstraction, at which we identify 
and analyze practices. As Adler and Pouliot note, “[c]onceptually, any given 
practice can be appraised through different levels of aggregation. For exam-
ple, the practice of international summitry is an aggregate of several compe-
tent performances, including formal dining, press conference delivery, bilat-
eral work meetings, etc.”63 Brunnée and Toope’s practice of legality can 
similarly be understood as being composed of multiple, smaller practices 
undertaken by various, overlapping communities of practice.
If there is no single, correct level of aggregation for the study of prac-
tices then, as Adler and Pouliot suggest, the appropriate level of aggregation 
62. Venzke has extensively addressed international courts in other writings. See, e.g.,
ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, IN WHOSE NAME? A PUBLIC LAW THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (2014).
63. International Practices, supra note 14, at 9.
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should be based on the specific research question at issue, informed by the 
experience and intersubjective understandings of those who engage in the 
practices under study. For Brunnée and Toope, a high level of aggregation, 
and the focus on a single “practice of legality,” are sensible given their ef-
forts to construct a synoptic theory of international legal obligation. Their 
omission of courts and judges is likewise understandable given the limited 
role of courts in the issue areas that they analyze. Similarly, the effort to 
conceptualize the entirety of international law as a practice, as Aalberts and 
Venzke do, quite naturally leads them to a high level of aggregation.
If we shift from grand theory to mid-range theory, however, and direct 
attention to issue areas in which courts are more prominent, it makes more 
sense to disaggregate the practice of legality into a number of discrete prac-
tices undertaken by different actors, including especially international judg-
es. This is particularly true with respect to issue areas—including trade law, 
human rights law, investment law, and international criminal law—in which 
international tribunals hear many cases and are increasingly critical actors.
Our approach to comparative international judicial practices also differs 
from the level of aggregation found in Meierhenrich’s ICC project. In one 
sense, our approach is narrower than Meierhenrich’s in that we focus on ju-
dicial practices, analyzing how judges organize and carry out their day-to-
day work of receiving and ruling on the admissibility and merits of cases, 
considering arguments, conducting hearings, and deliberating and drafting 
opinions. By contrast, most of the contributions to the ICC project focus on 
the practices of actors other than judges, including the member states that 
negotiated the Rome Statute,64 the Prosecutor and defense counsel,65 docu-
mentary filmmakers whose work represents the ICC to the public,66 and the 
broader international community.67 The various practices highlighted in 
these papers are important in their own right. Nevertheless, they fall largely 
outside the scope of our inquiry, as we consider non-judicial practices only 
insofar as these inform our primary focus on judges and judicial practices.
In another sense, however, our approach is substantially broader than 
that of the ICC project, in that we seek to understand the practices not of a 
single court in a single area of substantive law, but of a variety of courts 
(ICJ, WTO, CJEU, ECtHR, etc.) that operate across a wide variety of issue 
areas. Moreover, the papers in the ICC project explicitly disavow any inter-
est in generalizing beyond the ICC and do not compare that court to other 
international criminal tribunals or the broader universe of international 
64. Noah Weisbord, Bargaining Practices: Negotiating the Kampala Compromise for 
the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (2013).
65. Whiting, supra note 17; Kahn & Shah, supra note 17.
66. Wouter G. Werner, “We Cannot Allow Ourselves to Imagine What it All Means”:
Documentary Practices and the International Criminal Court, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
319 (2013).
67. Frédéric Mégret, Practices of Stigmatization, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287 
(2013).
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courts.68 Our approach, in contrast, is explicitly comparative, analyzing 
practices such as deliberation and opinion-drafting that are found at many or 
all international courts, yet take different forms across different courts.
Without further ado, we turn to this effort. In the next section, we offer 
what we believe is the first attempt to identify and analyze international ju-
dicial practices across different international courts.
II. International Judicial Practices
Having reviewed past applications of practice theory to international 
law, we now seek to extend this literature by developing a preliminary anal-
ysis of international judicial practices. For these purposes, we follow Adler 
and Pouliot in conceptualizing practices as “socially meaningful patterns of 
action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously 
embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in 
and on the material world.”69 International judges undertake many activities 
that exhibit the five dimensions of practice that Adler and Pouliot highlight.
More specifically, international judges (1) engage in multiple perfor-
mances, both private (when deliberating with other judges) and public (in 
their conduct of trials and arguments, composition of judicial decisions, off-
the bench writings, etc.). Moreover, these judicial practices are (2) highly 
patterned: they occur within the highly organized context of international 
law and litigation, while still leaving individual judges with “wiggle room 
for agency.”70 In addition, judicial practices are (3) performed in a more or 
less competent manner, as evaluated by relevant audiences—be they liti-
gants, member states, “the invisible college of international lawyers,”71 or a 
general public—against some set of intersubjective standards. Judicial deci-
sions, and other actions, also rest on (4) background knowledge of treaties, 
customary international law, case law, rules of court, and informal norms of 
“appropriate” judicial behavior. Finally, judicial practices (5) implicate and 
impact both the discursive and material worlds, taking the form of legal dis-
course but drawing upon material resources and having material conse-
quences for the litigants.
This section consists of two parts. First, we explain how judicial prac-
tices exist in the liminal space between structure and agency, but are reduci-
ble to neither. Next, we provide a typology of these practices, distinguishing 
between those that are not directly related to the litigation process and those 
68. See, e.g., Jens Meierhenrich, The Practice of International Law: A Theoretical 
Analysis, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 78 (2013) (counseling “a deliberate eschewing of 
generalization about the practice of international law,” in favor of detailed, interpretive, site-
specific research); see also infra Section IV.
69. International Practices, supra note 14, at 4.
70. Introduction and Framework, supra note 34, at 7.
71. Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L.
REV. 217 (1977).
Fall 2018] International Judicial Practices 63
that are. In each category, we briefly set forth a number of examples and, by 
way of illustration, provide more detailed analyses of a few specific practic-
es at multiple international courts. Although a comprehensive analysis of 
judicial practices is beyond the scope of this paper, we attempt in each case 
to highlight the diversity of practices across different international courts.
A. Judicial Practices: Between Structure and Agency
Practice theorists repeatedly emphasize that practices exist between 
structure and agency, but are reducible to neither. As Adler and Pouliot ex-
plain, “[p]ractices . . . are not merely descriptive ‘arrows’ that connect struc-
ture to agency and back, but rather the dynamic material and ideational pro-
cesses that enable structures to be stable or to evolve, and agents to 
reproduce or transform structures.”72 Similarly, Meierhenrich argues that a 
practice approach presents an alternative to both the structuralist approaches 
that long dominated anthropology and sociology, as well as the agentic or 
methodologically individualist approaches that have dominated political 
science.73 We likewise understand practices as occurring in the liminal space 
between structure and agency, and we view a practice approach to interna-
tional judicial behavior as complementing both structuralist and agentic ap-
proaches.
A purely structural approach to international courts, for example, might 
focus on the structural constraints imposed on judges by court statutes or by 
rules of procedure, which define the jurisdiction and composition of the 
court, the processes of judicial appointment and reappointment, and rules 
governing the conduct of judicial activity. Court statutes and rules do indeed 
establish broad parameters for judicial behavior. These structural con-
straints, however, are in most cases underdetermining, leaving considerable 
latitude for judges to enact a variety of possible practices.
For example, the Statute of the ICJ and the CJEU Statute each provide 
that the procedure of these courts “shall consist of two parts: written and 
oral.”74 ICJ judges have read this language to require holding an oral hear-
ing at the merits phase in every dispute—even when the litigants agree that 
a hearing is not necessary.75 CJEU judges, in contrast, read the identical lan-
guage in their court’s Statute as authorizing them to decide in each case 
whether an oral hearing is necessary.76 This example highlights the more 
general point that, within the more or less precise provisions of relevant 
72. Introduction and Framework, supra note 34, at 4–5.
73. Meierhenrich, supra note 60, at i–ii.
74. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 43, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]; Protocol No. 3: On the Statute of the Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Union, art. 20, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 210, 215 [hereinafter CJEU Statute].
75. SHABTAI ROSENNE, 3 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
1920-2005, at 1290 (4th ed. 2006).
76. Allan Rosas, Oral Hearings Before the European Court of Justice, 21 
MAASTRICHT J. 596, 598–99, 606 (2014).
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statutes and rules of court, international judges face and make real choices
about how to organize their professional activities. The resulting judicial 
practices cannot be reduced to or “read off” a given court’s statute or rules 
of procedure. Thus, at international courts, as elsewhere in international law, 
“it is not unusual to discover . . . that the authority formally provided in a 
written constitutional charter may be ignored, or totally redefined by unwrit-
ten practice.”77 The practices we discuss below arise out of individual and 
collective choices by judges, constrained, but not determined, by legal and 
political structures.
Neither, however, can judicial practices be reduced to individual ration-
al choices by utility-maximizing judges, as purely agentic approaches might 
suggest.78 To be sure, agentic approaches, which begin by identifying the 
judges’ presumed preferences and individual characteristics and then look 
for correlations between judicial characteristics and behavior, are capable of 
opening the “black box” of any court. Erik Voeten, for example, has under-
taken several exemplary studies of individual judges’ characteristics and 
voting patterns at the ECtHR.79 This empirical research reveals that judges’ 
professional backgrounds are systematically correlated with their voting in 
human rights cases, with former government diplomats and bureaucrats less 
likely to find a violation, and former private practitioners more likely to find 
a violation of human rights by a defendant state.80 This powerful approach 
demonstrates that extra-legal factors, such as individual judicial preferences 
and backgrounds, clearly shape judicial behavior at international courts.
Nevertheless, such purely agentic approaches have at least two im-
portant limitations. First, they fail to take adequate account of the strong in-
fluence exercised by informal norms and standards and the collective back-
ground knowledge embedded in judicial practices. Judges can, of course, 
violate these norms and practices, for example by frequently publishing 
long and impassioned dissents against the opinion of the majority, but doing 
so will likely trigger certain reputational costs among fellow judges and 
others in the relevant communities of practice.81
Second, the correlations revealed by purely agentic approaches may al-
low scholars to predict judicial votes and thereby which party is likely to 
prevail in an action. But the notion that an international court’s exclusive, or 
77. Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Deci-
sion, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 260 (1967).
78. For one influential example of this approach, see Richard A. Posner, What Do 
Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993).
79. Erik Voeten, The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European 
Court of Human Rights, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 417 (2008) [hereinafter Voeten, Impartiali-
ty]; Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L ORG. 669 (2007) [hereinafter Voeten, Politics].
80. Voeten, Impartiality, supra note 79, at 430.
81. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic, Judging Judges: A Statistical Exercise, EJIL: TALK
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/judging-judges-a-statistical-exercise/.
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at least predominant, role is dispute resolution simpliciter elides other im-
portant functions that contemporary international courts play.82 For exam-
ple, among other functions, international courts serve to control and legiti-
mate the exercise of public authority and to stabilize normative expecta-
expectations.83 Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, international 
courts exercise a law-making function.84 Through the processes of articulat-
ing and interpreting relevant norms and principles, applying abstract princi-
ples to concrete cases, and analogizing and distinguishing present from past 
cases, international courts contribute significantly to the development of in-
ternational law across a wide variety of doctrinal areas.85 Attention to judi-
cial practices, such as the process of deliberation and modalities of drafting 
opinions, in contrast, holds the promise of illuminating more of the “real 
life” of the law, which is rooted in the scope, style, and reasoning of judicial 
opinions. For all of these reasons, we see scholarly attention to judicial prac-
tices as a necessary complement to existing structural and agentic studies of 
international courts.
B. A Typology of International Judicial Practices
We now turn to an identification and analysis of these practices.86 This 
mapping exercise represents a preliminary effort to illustrate how many and 
what kind of judicial practices exist. We readily concede that our listing is 
hardly exhaustive and that other categories could be used; indeed, we en-
courage other scholars to develop alternative classification schemes. More-
over, given the range and number of international judicial practices, our de-
scriptions are necessarily brief, although, by way of illustration, we provide 
a more detailed analysis of a few practices at several of the most prominent 
international tribunals.
The overview that follows distinguishes among several broad categories 
of judicial practices. At a relatively high level of generality, we begin by 
characterizing international judicial practices as falling within one of two 
broad categories: those that are not directly related to the litigation process 
82. Karen J. Alter, The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforce-
ment, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review, in Dunoff & Pollack, 
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 345 (analyzing multiple functions of in-
ternational courts).
83. Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Functions of International Courts: 
An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 49, 54 
(2013).
84. The classic articulation of this claim remains HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1958).
85. E.g., THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE (Christian J. Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013).
86. The analysis that follows elaborates and expands a preliminary typology found in 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, A Typology of International Judicial Practices, in THE 
JUDICIALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MIXED BLESSING? 86 (Andreas Follesdal & 
Geir Ulfstein eds., 2018).
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(such as those concerning interactions with coordinate treaty bodies or with 
judges at other tribunals) and those that are directly related to the litigation 
process (such as those concerning pleadings, deliberations, and opinion-
writing). To orient the reader to the discussion that follows, Table 1 pro-
vides a simplified typology of international judicial practices common to 
most, if not all, international courts. 
Table 1. A Typology of Selected International 
Judicial Practices
Practices not directly related 
to litigation
Practices directly related to 
litigation
? Interactions with coordinate 
treaty bodies
? Interactions with other court 
staff and officials
? Interactions with judges of 
other international tribunals
? Interactions with domestic 
officials
? Law-related but non-judicial 
activities such as lecturing, 
teaching, and publishing
? Internal organization and 
administration of tribunal
? Training of new judges
? Appointment and 
reappointment to bench
? Background features of litigation, 
including official and unofficial 
languages
? Case management, including role 
of judges in facilitating settlement
? Receipt and response to written 
pleadings
? Conduct of oral pleadings
? Receipt and evaluation of 
evidence, including practices 
concerning experts
? Format of judicial deliberations
? Drafting of judgment 
This table suggests several preliminary observations regarding interna-
tional judicial practices. First, the table demonstrates the breadth and diver-
sity of practices that international judges engage in, concerning litigation as 
well as other aspects of a court’s activities. Second, practices concerning the 
litigation process exist throughout a litigation’s life cycle, from the moment 
a case is filed to the release of a final judgment. Third, judicial practices are 
not freestanding or isolated activities. Rather, the nature and character of 
any particular practice is interdependent with a court’s other judicial prac-
tices. Thus, a court’s practices regarding oral proceedings will be, in part, a 
function of its practices regarding written proceedings. Finally, as detailed 
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below, there is considerable, and even dramatic, variation across courts in 
the specific content of their practices.
1. Practices Not Directly Related to the Litigation Process
Judicial practices most obviously occur in connection with the disposi-
tion of cases. But international judges often find themselves engaged in re-
peated and structured interactions with actors outside of the litigation con-
text. By way of illustration, we provide an extended discussion of one of 
these practices, concerning relations with coordinate treaty bodies, and 
much briefer treatments of practices concerning relations between judges 
and other court officials, relations with judges of other international courts, 
relations with domestic officials, practices concerning extra-judicial activi-
ties, and the nomination, election, and reelection of international judges.
a. Practices Concerning Relations with Coordinate Treaty Bodies
Many international courts are embedded within larger treaty-based in-
stitutional structures.87 Constitutive treaties typically provide little guidance 
regarding the relations between international courts and coordinate treaty 
bodies. Nonetheless, international judges interact with coordinate bodies in 
myriad ways that are unrelated to specific litigations. Consider, for example, 
the ICJ’s practice of preparing and submitting annual reports to the UN 
General Assembly and the related practice of the ICJ President’s annual 
speech to the General Assembly. These patterned activities have analogues 
in the practices of other international tribunals, many of which likewise pre-
pare and submit annual reports.88 Legal scholars understand these annual re-
ports as a convenient compendium of a court’s recent activity, as a formal 
opportunity for judges to justify budgetary requests before bodies that have 
budgetary authority, and/or as a useful mechanism for promoting oversight 
by the bodies that receive these reports.
What is gained by considering these reports through the lens of practice 
theory? To begin, we note that nothing in the ICJ’s Statute or Rules requires 
87. Thus, for example, the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, 
which also consists of the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, 
Trusteeship Council, Secretariat, and any number of subsidiary bodies; the Uruguay Round 
Agreements create, in addition to the WTO’s Appellate Body, a Secretariat, Ministerial Con-
ference, General Council and a variety of standing committees and other subsidiary bodies; 
and the ECtHR is part of a larger institutional structure including the Council of Europe, 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly, and Secretary-General.
88. Sometimes, an annual report is required by treaty. For example, ICC submits an 
annual report to the UN General Assembly pursuant to the relationship agreement between the 
United Nations and the International Criminal Court. See Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Ct., U.N. 
Doc. A/69/321 (Sept. 18, 2014). The ICTR and ICTY submit annual reports pursuant to pro-
visions in the Statutes creating these courts. See, e.g., Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Tribunal for 
Rwanda, U.N. Doc. A/69/206-S/2014/546 (Aug. 1, 2014); Rep. of the Int’l Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/69/225-S/2014/556 (Aug. 1, 2014).
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submission of an annual report and that the judges did not always prepare 
annual reports. Indeed, the judges of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (“PCIJ”), the ICJ’s predecessor, did not submit annual reports to the 
Assembly of the League of Nations, and ICJ judges did not prepare annual 
reports until 1968. This thumbnail history begs the questions of what moti-
vated judges to institute this practice and what purpose it serves.
We believe that the roots of this practice can be found in the highly crit-
ical reaction to the ICJ’s 1966 judgment in the South West Africa cases, 
which held that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked standing to challenge South Af-
rica’s alleged violations of the League of Nations’ Mandate for South West 
Africa.89 The decision triggered a political firestorm, but “[p]erhaps the 
most significant consequence of this crisis was a new self-awareness and 
change of attitude on the part of the Court itself.”90 In response to an acute 
“crisis of confidence” in the Court, the judges undertook several efforts to 
improve relations with the UN system.
In particular, in April 1967, the Court created a “Committee on Rela-
tions,” consisting of three judges responsible for the development of the 
Court’s relations with other UN organs and international bodies.91 Shortly 
thereafter, the Court launched various efforts designed to address the politi-
cal fallout resulting from the South West Africa decision.92 In 1967, for the 
first time, members of the Court visited and addressed the International Law 
Commission. In 1968, the ICJ issued its first annual report and hosted, for 
the first time, a visit by the UN Secretary General. Also, since 1968, a dele-
gation from the Court, headed by its President, has attended and presented 
an oral report to the General Assembly’s regular sessions.93 In these oral re-
ports, the President describes the Court’s decisions of the preceding year 
and often requests continued or increased budgetary support. In 2000, the 
ICJ President initiated a practice of providing a private briefing to the Secu-
89. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), Judgment, 1966 I.C.J. 
Rep. 6 (July 18). This dispute involved a challenge by Ethiopia and Liberia to South Africa’s
efforts to impose its apartheid system on South West Africa. In a 1966 judgment, the Court 
ruled by a vote of 8-7 that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked standing to pursue this action, notwith-
standing that the Court previously rejected South Africa’s efforts to contest the Court’s juris-
diction. For a critical assessment, see Wolfgang G. Friedmann, The Jurisprudential Implica-
tions of the South West Africa Case, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1 (1967). 
90. Georges Abi-Saab, The International Court as a World Court, in FIFTY YEARS OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 3, 6 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 
1996).
91. Work of the Court in 1967-1968, 1967–1968 I.C.J. Y.B. 82, 92–93.
92. For reactions, see, e.g., D.P. Forsythe, The International Court of Justice at Fifty, in
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 385, 393 
(A.S. Muller et al. eds., 1997) (“South West Africa was the ICJ’s Dred Scott decision.”); Rich-
ard A. Falk, The South West Africa Cases: An Appraisal, 21 INT’L ORG. 1, 1 (1967) (“[The 
decision generated] widespread hostility to the ICJ and indirectly seem[s] to have damaged 
the cause of international law in general.”).
93. Salo Engel, Annual Reports of the International Court of Justice to the General 
Assembly, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 193 (1970).
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rity Council, where he or she describes pending proceedings and the Court’s 
role in the peaceful settlement of disputes.94
The ICJ’s annual report, the President’s annual visit to the General As-
sembly, and the now-annual briefing of the Security Council are repetitive 
and patterned performances that occur within the highly organized setting of 
UN politics and procedures. Moreover, these practices can be performed 
more or less competently, referring not to whether the report accurately 
summarizes the Court’s recent activities, but rather to the report’s efficacy 
in communicating a message that enhances the Court’s stature or legitimacy 
with the General Assembly, Security Council, and related audiences. These 
practices likewise weave together discursive and material worlds. The annu-
al report’s text and President’s speeches are discursive practices which, if 
performed competently, can impact the political and material support the 
UN’s political bodies provide to the Court.
Finally, these practices exist in the liminal space between agency and 
structure. The structure includes the rules surrounding the timing and organ-
ization of the General Assembly’s annual sessions as well as informal rules 
regarding the diplomatic protocol associated with UN proceedings. Within 
these various structural constraints, ICJ judges exercise substantial agency, 
as they have wide discretion regarding whether and how to frame requests 
for material support or to signal how the UN’s political bodies can best en-
hance the likelihood of compliance with ICJ decisions. Thus, these practices 
convey “social meanings,” which have much more to do with efforts by 
judges to enhance their court’s stature and reputation among relevant con-
stituencies than it does with the ostensible informational purpose of describ-
ing the court’s activities over the preceding year.
b. Practices Concerning Relations Between Judges and 
Other Court Officials,Particularly the Registry
Just as international organizations are typically comprised of several 
organs, international courts themselves are often comprised of various bod-
ies as well. For example, every international court has a registry, which is 
responsible for providing general administrative support to the court.95 In 
addition to processing cases and communicating with counsel, registries are 
variously responsible for translating judgments into a court’s official lan-
guages; facilitating judges’ access to information technology; conducting 
media and public relations; maintaining the court library; and other adminis-
trative matters. Significantly, at some courts, registry officials play im-
94. An unclassified summary of Judge Higgins’ November 2007 briefing can be found 
at: President of the International Court of Justice Briefs the Security Council on Recent Cas-
es, WIKILEAKS (Nov. 14, 2007), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/
07USUNNEWYORK1012_a.html.
95. At the AB, these services are provided by the Appellate Body Secretariat.
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portant roles in the drafting of opinions.96 Although registries are formally 
independent, they often function under the authority of the court, and regis-
try officials engage in sustained and regularized interactions with the judg-
es, both individually and collectively. These interactions can be analyzed 
under the rubric of practice theory.
c. Practices Concerning Relations with Judges of 
Other International Courts
Unlike domestic courts, international courts operate in a highly decen-
tralized and nonhierarchical setting. Thus, as a matter of formal legal doc-
trine, different international tribunals rarely have formal, treaty-based rela-
tions with one another. Nevertheless, judges from different international 
courts often engage with each other in highly patterned ways. At a very 
basic level, international judges have developed and institutionalized prac-
tices of sharing opinions and other information.97 More significantly, judges 
from different international courts also regularly engage in face-to-face in-
teractions in various workshops, conferences, seminars, and a variety of 
other forums. For example, the ICJ hosts seminars on topics of mutual inter-
est with judges from other international and regional courts.98 The ECtHR 
hosts an annual “Seminar-Dialogue between Judges” involving judges from 
multiple courts,99 and the judges from the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and ECtHR exchange visits to discuss issues of mutual concern.100
Similar undertakings are also organized by international organizations101 and 
nongovernmental bodies.102 The participation of judges from different inter-
national courts in these various forums has given rise to a set of patterned 
96. See, e.g., Hugh Thirlway, The Drafting of ICJ Decisions: Some Personal Recollec-
tions and Observations, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1, 15 (2006).
97. For example, in 2006, the ICJ’s President initiated a system whereby the Court sent 
summaries and excerpts of relevant ICJ judgments to judges at the CJEU, ECHR, ICC, ICTR, 
ICTY, and WTO AB. Judges at these courts, in turn, reciprocated and sent summaries or ex-
cerpts of decisions to their brethren at the ICJ. See PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL 
JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND FRAGMENTATION 220 (2013).
98. In 2014, for example, the ICJ held a seminar for judges of the East African Court of 
Justice. Rep. of the Int’l Court of Justice, ¶ 236, U.N. Doc. A/69/4 (Aug. 1, 2014).
99. The proceedings of these seminars are available at: Video Recording: Dialogue be-
tween Judges Seminar, held by the European Court of Human Rights, https://
www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?c=&p=court/events (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
100. See, e.g., 2012 INTER-AM. CT. H.R., 90 (describing 2012 visit by ECHR judges to 
ICHR, corresponding to 2011 visit by ICHR judges to ECHR).
101. See, e.g., International Courts and Tribunals - The Challenges Ahead, COUNCIL 
EUR. (Oct. 6–7, 2008), https://www.coe.int/en/web/cahdi/international-courts-and-tribunals-
the-challenges-ahead (involving judges from ICC, ICJ, ICTR, ICTY, ITLOS, ECtHR, CJEU, 
IACHR, African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, WTO AB, EFTA Court).
102. See, e.g., Brandeis Inst. for Int’l Judges, Judicial Dialogue in Action: International 
Judges Reflect, Brandeis U., http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/internationaljustice/biij/
BIIJ_articles.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
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interactions with strong performative dimensions that can be analyzed under 
the vernacular of practice theory.
d. Practices Concerning Relations with Domestic Officials
Many international judges engage in patterned interactions with their 
domestic counterparts. The most prominent and developed set of relation-
ships is that between the CJEU and national courts of EU member states. A 
large literature details how the CJEU used the mechanism of the preliminary 
ruling to build a body of case law that created domestic constituencies for 
EU law and skillfully “recruited” domestic courts to help drive European 
integration.103
Scholars pay substantially less attention, however, to other types of pat-
terned interactions involving the CJEU and domestic legal actors, including 
domestic judges. For example, over the years, the CJEU has organized and 
run a number of seminars and other training sessions for domestic judges 
from member states.104 These sessions provide an opportunity for CJEU 
judges to present their understanding of EU law, to explain the preliminary 
reference system, to develop professional networks, and, indirectly, to en-
courage the referral of additional cases. ITLOS similarly organizes capacity-
building and training sessions for judges and government officials at the 
seat of the court and in the field.105 These sessions not only educate domestic 
officials about the court’s role and functions, but also implicitly invite 
greater use of the court. Notably, the division of responsibility for training 
sessions between judges and registry officials varies across international 
courts, and this variation in the “outsourcing” of training functions can itself 
be viewed as a judicial practice.106
e. Practices Concerning Extra-Judicial Activities
International judges undertake significant off-the-bench, law-related ac-
tivities including teaching courses, delivering lectures, participating in aca-
demic seminars, and drafting scholarly papers. They undertake these varied 
activities subject to a shared body of background knowledge with which 
judges and their interlocutors are presumably familiar. In this community of 
practice, international judges are expected not to comment on pending dis-
103. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Politi-
cal Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993); Joseph H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revo-
lution: The European Court and Its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510 (1994). 
104. A number of other institutions also provide training in EU law to domestic judges, 
including the Academy of European Law and the European Judicial Training Network.
105. See, e.g., Training, ITLOS, https://www.itlos.org/the-registry/training/ (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2018). 
106. For a theoretically informed survey of the “socialization” activities of international 
courts, see Nicole De Silva, International Courts’ Socialization Strategies for Actual and Per-
ceived Performance, in THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 288 (Theresa
Squatrito et al. eds., 2018).
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putes. Likewise, in public settings, an international judge will only rarely 
criticize the judicial reasoning of another judge. Even then, they only do so 
discreetly and indirectly. In off-the-bench writings, it is expected that judges 
will, from time to time, criticize a particular holding or doctrinal develop-
ment, but do so diplomatically and constructively and not in a way that 
could draw the court into disrepute. Thus, judges’ off-the-bench activities 
are constrained by a substantial body of background knowledge, much of 
which is tacit and not recorded in Rules of Court.
Just as importantly, judges’ off-the-bench activities serve to create
background knowledge. For example, Antoine Vauchez perceptively argues 
that the regularized and frequent participation of CJEU judges in various 
“Festschriften, tributes, eulogies, [and] Courts’ jubilees” constitute a form 
of “institutional rites” whereby the participating judges define and maintain 
the Court’s symbolic community and revive and transmit the Court’s “insti-
tutional identity” to the relevant community of practice.107 Judges at other 
tribunals undertake many of the same activities. ICJ judges, for example, 
frequently participate in (and are the subject of) festschrifts and other events 
that, at least implicitly, celebrate the Court as an institution108 and both re-
flect and propagate the judges’ self-understanding of the meaning of their 
professional undertakings. Similarly, a substantial number of current and 
former WTO Appellate Body (“AB”) members have, in off-the-bench writ-
ings, described the AB’s birth and analyzed efforts by early AB members to 
establish the authority and legitimacy of their fledging tribunal.109
f. Practices of Nomination, Election, and Reelection
Of course, prior to engaging in judicial practices, an individual must 
first become a judge on an international tribunal. Although judicial nomina-
tion and election procedures vary across international courts, in almost eve-
ry case, member states nominate potential judges. These judicial candidates 
then participate in an election conducted by an intergovernmental body. 
These elections are often accompanied by various forms of campaigning, 
and over time, “a collection of practices and activities . . . have developed” 
in this area.110 While officials from the candidate’s home state undertake 
107. Antoine Vauchez, Keeping the Dream Alive: The European Court of Justice and 
the Transnational Fabric of Integrationist Jurisprudence, 4 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 51 (2012).
108. See, e.g., FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA, (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011) (featuring contributions by several 
past, current, and future international judges). 
109. For example, several current and former AB members contributed to A HISTORY OF 
LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE GATT/WTO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW IN THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (Gabrielle Marceau ed., 2015). 
110. The fullest account of these practices, focused on ICJ and ICC elections is found in 
RUTH MACKENZIE, ET AL., SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS AND 
POLITICS 110 (2010); see also Ruth Mackenzie, The Selection of International Judges, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 737. 
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much of the campaign work, judicial candidates themselves are increasingly 
involved in the campaign process. ICJ nominees are expected to visit the 
General Assembly, meet with various national groups and government offi-
cials, pay courtesy visits to embassies, attend Permanent Mission functions, 
and speak at regional and international forums.111
Candidates for the WTO’s AB likewise engage in extended campaigns. 
In particular, among AB candidates, “a practice has developed whereby 
[nominees] call on various diplomatic missions in Geneva with a view to 
securing support in the selection process.”112 Over time, as states have be-
come more concerned about judicial activism, the nature of this practice has 
evolved. AB candidates have become subject to ever more intensive screen-
ing and detailed questioning by Geneva-based delegates, who seek to de-
termine the candidate’s orientation toward judicial decision-making.113
Judicial elections are often closely contested;114 candidates who perform 
the practices surrounding elections less competently risk losing the oppor-
tunity to become international judges. Nevertheless, the practices surround-
ing campaigning for seats on international tribunals remain a largely unex-
plored topic ripe for scholarly attention.
There are, of course, many more practices not directly related to the lit-
igation process, but even this abbreviated discussion should be sufficient to 
indicate the wide range of practices that could productively be explored by 
students of international courts. For now, however, let us now turn to prac-
tices that are more directly related to the litigation process.
2. Practices Related to the Litigation Process
International judges engage in a diverse array of practices at different 
stages of the litigation process. For ease of exposition, we organize these 
practices in terms of the stage of the litigation process to which they are 
most relevant. Thus, we discuss judicial practices that contribute to the “in-
stitutional” or “background” features of the litigation environment, judicial 
practices concerning the written and oral pleadings, judicial practices con-
cerning evidence and fact-finding, judicial practices concerning evidentiary 
burdens, and judicial practices concerning deliberation and opinion-writing. 
These categories are necessarily imprecise, as many practices are relevant to 
111. MACKENZIE, supra note 110.
112. Valerie Hughes, The Institutional Dimension, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 269, 281 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009).
113. Manfred Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and International Courts: The 
Politics of Judicial Appointment at the World Trade Organization, 20 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 391, 
407–08 (2014).
114. See Dapo Akande, General Assembly and Security Council Elect Four Judges to 
the ICJ but Fail to Agree on Fifth Judge. What Happens Next?, EJIL: TALK!, (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/general-assembly-and-security-council-elect-four-judges-to-the-icj-
but-fail-to-elect-fifth-judge/. 
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more than one stage of the litigation process. The discussion that follows is 
intended to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive.
a.  Judicial Practices That Contribute to the “Institutional” or 
“Background”Features of the Litigation Environment
? Orientation and Training of New Judges. Newly appointed in-
ternational judges bring a wide range of professional back-
grounds and cultural understandings, and international courts 
face the challenge of melding a diverse group of individuals in-
to a well-functioning bench. To do so, incoming judges at most 
courts undergo training or orientation designed to familiarize 
them with how the court functions. Significantly, neither the 
structure nor the content of these training efforts is mandated 
by treaty, but rather reflects decisions made over time by judg-
es at each court and practices regarding training for new judges 
vary across courts. At some courts, more experienced judges 
are expected to take newer judges under their wings and “show 
them the ropes,” a process colloquially known at the CJEU as 
the “godfather system.”115 At others, training and orientation is
largely the responsibility of registry officials rather than in-
cumbent judges. Judicial socialization at international tribunals 
remains largely uncharted territory,116 and practice theory pro-
vides a useful theoretical framework for exploring this topic.
? Linguistic Practices. International tribunals are, by design, 
populated by individuals from different regions of the world. 
As these individuals often speak different languages, interna-
tional tribunals have specified working or official languages. 
The selection of official languages helps determine which indi-
viduals are qualified to serve as judges, the effectiveness of dif-
ferent judges, which counsel will appear before a tribunal, and 
even the way that different legal concepts are understood and 
used.
Paradoxically, courts with global geographic reach are often the most 
restrictive when it comes to languages. Thus, at the ICJ and ITLOS, submis-
sions are accepted, proceedings carried out, and judgments rendered only in 
the official languages of French and English. Judges at regional courts adopt 
a variety of approaches. At one end of the spectrum, the CJEU and ECtHR 
accept applications in any of the languages spoken in the member states. At 
the other end of spectrum, the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”)
115. DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE 66 (2007).
116. But see De Silva, supra note 106. The seminal work concerning training of judges 
on U.S. federal courts remains Beverly Blair Cook, The Socialization of New Federal Judges: 
Impact on District Court Business, 1971 WASH. U. L.Q. 253 (1971).
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Court’s only working language is English, and all documents are required to 
be submitted in English.
Moreover, courts often distinguish between the language(s) of the pro-
ceedings and those of the Court’s internal workings. Thus, while the CJEU 
and ECtHR accept pleadings in many languages, CJEU judges deliberate in 
French, and ECtHR judges deliberate in French or English. At the WTO, the 
official languages are English, French, and Spanish, but as a matter of prac-
tice, panel and AB proceedings are conducted in English,117 whereas reports 
are typically drafted in English and then translated into French and Spanish. 
The ICC’s official languages are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, 
and Spanish, although its working languages are English and French.118
Language practices impact a court’s internal workings. A judge fluent 
only in a less frequently used official language is likely to be less influential 
than her peers given her limited ability to communicate with colleagues. A 
court’s language practices also impact the judicial interactions with parties 
and witnesses. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via’s (“ICTY”) working languages are French and English, yet many wit-
nesses and defense counsel speak only Bosnian, Croatian, and/or Serbian. In 
such cases, judges cannot directly communicate with counsel or witnesses. 
Language practices likewise affect a court’s communications with other au-
diences as well. ICTY judgments are issued in English and French; hence, 
the official versions of these texts cannot necessarily be read by many who 
live in the Balkans, the tribunal’s primary regional audience. Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly, a court’s language practices can substantially 
impact its jurisprudence. The use of different languages may, in turn, pro-
duce differences in style, emphasis, and terminology in judicial opinions.119
As Carlo Focarelli explains:
Language is key to the construction of reality, including the reality 
of international law. The fact that the lingua franca today is English 
implies that the English logic, worldview, and preferences are more 
likely to prevail and shape what ‘reality’ is taken to mean. The 
dominance of the English language forces the international law de-
bate into a specific mode of thought which is far from being as uni-
117. Bradley J. Condon, Lost in Translation: Plurilingual Interpretation of WTO Law, 1 
J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 191, 191–92 (2010) (first panel proceeding argued in Spanish 
took place in September 2006).
118. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 50, ¶¶ 1–2, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
119. See James Crawford & Alain Pellet, Anglo Saxon and Continental Approaches to 
Pleading Before the ICJ, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM AND 
FRAGMENTATION 831 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds., 2008).
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versal as English itself apparently is, and reinforces the Western bi-
as in its Anglo-American variant.120
In short, the rise of English as the dominant language at many interna-
tional tribunals is thought to result in an overrepresentation of native, or, at 
least fluent, English speakers as lawyers, judges, and international civil 
servants; an infusion and privileging of common law orientations and con-
cepts over civil law analogues; and an increasing “Americanization” of in-
ternational litigation practices and strategies.121
b. Judicial Practices Concerning the Written Pleadings
At virtually every international court, it is expected that written plead-
ings will develop a full account of the facts, the pleas and arguments of the 
parties, and the relief sought. Courts have developed written and unwritten 
norms governing the structure, format, and content of these written submis-
sions. Courts differ, however, with respect to many issues that impact the 
written pleadings, including the number of submissions; the sequencing and 
order of submissions (seriatim or simultaneous); the lengths of and time 
limits for pleadings; the role of written pleadings in the fact-finding process; 
and whether written submissions are treated as public documents. In addi-
tion, courts vary widely on whether third parties or amicus curiae are per-
mitted to submit written pleadings. Moreover, courts differ as to the relative 
importance of the written and oral pleadings; they also differ as to whether 
an oral hearing is required. Thus, in some instances, the written pleadings 
may be the only opportunity a litigant has to attempt to persuade the court of 
the merits of its case. Court statutes only rarely address these issues; in most 
instances these issues are governed by judge-made rules and practices, 
which vary across courts. Different judicial approaches to each of these is-
sues will substantially impact the nature and content of parties’ submissions 
that, in turn, will frame the judges’ disposition of the action.
Finally, we note that judicial practices regarding oral proceedings, dis-
cussed below, are deeply intertwined with those regarding written plead-
ings. For example, at international criminal tribunals, parties introduce evi-
dence at trial. In WTO proceedings, in contrast, parties introduce the bulk of 
the evidence through written pleadings, and oral proceedings serve as an 
opportunity to explore issues the panel deems most important. In this con-
text, as elsewhere, practices relevant to one aspect of the litigation process 
120. CARLO FOCARELLI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 93 (2012) (italicization omitted).
121. TERRIS ET AL., supra note 115, at 78; Gleider I. Hernández, On Multilingualism 
and the International Legal Process, in 2 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 441, 452 (Hélène Ruiz Fabri et al. eds., 2008). For a more general 
analysis of the rise of English, see ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW 
INTERNATIONAL? 260–68 (2017).
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are not free-floating or isolated, but are a function of practices that are rele-
vant to other aspects of the litigation process.
c. Judicial Practices Concerning the Oral Proceedings
The performative dimension of oral proceedings is, if anything, even 
more pronounced than that associated with written proceedings. In the 
words of one experienced counsel, “[t]he oral pleadings are the last act of a 
long play.”122 And the variation in judicial practices across international 
courts with respect to oral proceedings is likewise even larger than the var-
iation regarding written pleadings—including whether or not oral hearings 
are even held. For current purposes, we focus only on variations in the 
length, structure, and format of the oral proceedings, although many other 
variations exist.
At the ICJ, the length of merits hearings varies considerably by case, 
but often occupies between two and six weeks.123 Historically, ICJ oral pro-
ceedings often featured counsel reading prepared texts that replicated the 
content of the written submissions.124 In recent years, however, the Court 
has made efforts to limit the time devoted to counsel’s oral presentations, 
and hearings today often allot considerable time to the examination of wit-
nesses and other processes for receiving evidence.
Oral hearings at the WTO’s AB, in contrast, often last only one or two 
days. Apart from brief opening and closing statements from counsel, hear-
ings consist primarily of questions from AB members and responses.125 At 
other tribunals, oral proceedings are often considerably shorter. The CJEU 
recently reduced the normal speaking time of the initial oral submissions 
from twenty to fifteen minutes126 and—in a substantial change from past 
practice—now devotes a substantial part of the hearing “to questions that 
the members of the Court wish to put to the participants after their initial 
oral submissions and eventually also to a discussion between the parties or 
interested persons with respect to the questions raised.”127 At the ECtHR, 
finally, the procedure in most cases is entirely written, but the Court can de-
122. Alain Pellet, The Role of the International Lawyer in International Litigation, in
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER AS PRACTITIONER 161 (Chanaka Wickremasinghe ed., 2000).
123. THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 1007 
(Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2006).
124. ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 971 (2013).
125. Yasuhei Taniguchi, The WTO Dispute Settlement as Seen by a Proceduralist, 42 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2009).
126. Rules of Procedure: Practice Directions to Parties Concerning Cases Brought Be-
fore the Court, 2014 O.J. 12, ¶52 (L 31); E.C.J., Notes for the Guidance of Counsel (Feb. 
2009).
127. Rosas, supra note 76, at 609.
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cide to hold oral hearings, which are in principle public.128 In practice, there 
is a sharp disparity between the small number of Grand Chamber hearings, 
where half-day hearings are generally held and webcast, and the much larg-
er number of cases before smaller chambers, where oral hearings are the 
very rare exception.
d. Judicial Practices Concerning the Production and Receipt of 
Evidence and Fact-Finding
The determination of facts is at the heart of the litigation process and of 
decisive importance in many cases. Fact-finding serves at least two im-
portant functions. First, “the production and management of evidence con-
stitute the most crucial building blocks in ensuring a just and well-reasoned 
judicial outcome in a dispute between sovereign States.”129 Second, the ac-
curate determination of facts enables international courts to establish author-
itative and truthful historical accounts of events and facts.130 Notwithstand-
ing the importance of evidentiary practices, international tribunals’ 
performance in this area has been subject to sustained criticism.131
Court statutes generally contain only vague provisions regarding evi-
dentiary matters. Thus, the ICJ Statute simply provides that the Court shall 
“make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence,” leaving 
judges with broad discretion to develop whatever modalities they consider 
necessary to collect evidence.132 The Court has admitted various types of ev-
idence, including maps, photographs, recordings, videotapes, and satellite-
generated imagery. It may call (but not compel) witnesses or experts to give 
evidence and may make site visits.133 On occasion, the ICJ has held in cam-
era proceedings.134
Judges at different international courts adopt widely varying practices 
with respect to fact-finding. As might be expected of tribunals consisting of 
individuals from diverse legal traditions, these practices do not always cor-
respond to familiar domestic law categories, such as “adversarial” or “in-
128. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The European Court of Human Rights, in THE 
RULES, PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 323, 
334 (Chiara Giorgetti ed., 2012).
129. Peter Tomka, President of the Int’l Court of Justice, Speech to the Sixth Committee 
of the General Assembly (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/press-releases/8/
18398.pdf.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., ANNA RIDDELL & BRENDAN PLANT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (2009); NANCY A. COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT 
FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS (2010). 
132. ICJ Statute, supra note 74, art. 48.
133. Although not addressed in their statutes, the ITLOS and ECtHR judges have also 
determined that they possess authority to conduct site visits.
134. See HUGH THIRLWAY, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 101–02 (2016).
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quisitorial” styles of fact-finding. For example, the ICTY’s early trials used 
processes that were predominantly adversarial in nature, but over time the 
judges incorporated elements of civil law proceedings, producing a system 
that was neither wholly adversarial nor wholly inquisitorial.135
WTO panelists often examine whether domestic administrative pro-
ceedings are consistent with procedural and substantive obligations in the
relevant WTO agreements. In such disputes, panelists sit more as a court of 
review than as finders of fact. In other disputes, panelists do sit as triers of 
fact. Since there is no “trial” at which parties present their evidence, evi-
dence is introduced through written submissions, and panelists have devel-
oped a practice of “participat[ing] actively in and shap[ing] the process of 
fact finding.”136
e. Judicial Practices Regarding Experts
International litigations increasingly involve highly complex and tech-
nical issues.137 In such cases, parties or the court may seek expert opinion. 
Virtually every court permits parties to present evidence through expert wit-
nesses. In addition, many international tribunals, including the ICJ, CJEU, 
ITLOS, and WTO panels, have authority to appoint their own experts.138 But 
courts vary in their use of this authority. The ICJ and CJEU, for example, 
rarely appoint experts.139 The reason for this practice may be to avoid the 
associated expenses, which would fall on the court; a fear of delaying pro-
ceedings; or a desire to avoid the perception that part of the judicial function 
has been delegated to an outside party.
Other tribunals, in contrast, are more open to appointing experts. For 
example, over a dozen WTO panels have used scientific experts, and input 
was sought from other international organizations—presumably because of 
their expertise—in an additional nineteen disputes.140 Panels developed a 
practice of appointing experts even when the parties have not so requested 
135. See, e.g., Kai Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: “Adversarial”, “Inquisi-
torial” or Mixed?, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2003).
136. MICHELLE T. GRANDO, EVIDENCE, PROOF, AND FACT-FINDING IN WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 249 (2009).
137. See Jean D’Aspremont & Makane Moïse Mbengue, Strategies of Engagement with 
Scientific Fact-Finding in International Adjudication, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT. 240, 246 
(2014).
138. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 289, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
art. 13, ¶ 1, Apr. 13, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]; CJEU Statute, supra note 74, art. 25; ICJ 
Statute, supra note 74, art. 50.
139. See, e.g., Daniel Peat, The Use of Court-Appointed Experts by the International 
Court of Justice, 84 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 271 (2014).
140. Gabrielle Z. Marceau & Jennifer K. Hawkins, Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement,
3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT. 493, 494–95 (2012).
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or agree that an outside expert is not needed,141 and it appears that panels of-
ten afford substantial weight to the opinions of panel-appointed experts.142
Courts’ divergent practices with respect to experts have implications for the 
quality of the court’s fact-finding and judgment, as well as for the parties’ 
litigation strategies.
f.  Judicial Practices Regarding the Burden of Proof and 
Standard of Proof
In any legal dispute, the allocation of the burden of proof and selection 
of the standard of proof can be outcome determinative. Again, international 
courts exhibit wide variation on these matters. At the ICJ, it is clear that the 
party alleging a fact bears the burden of proving it; the Court has been nota-
bly reluctant, however, to set out a general standard of proof. For example, 
in Oil Platforms, the Court simply noted that the evidence on a certain mat-
ter was “insufficient,” without specifying what quantum of proof would be 
sufficient.143 In other cases, the Court has indicated that the standard of 
proof will vary based on the subject matter and nature of each dispute.144
The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) does not address 
the burden of proof. The AB has decided that the party who asserts a fact, 
whether complainant or respondent, has the burden of coming forward with 
evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case. Once this happens, the bur-
den shifts to the opposing party, who will fail to discharge its burden unless 
it submits sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.145 The ECtHR’s case 
law establishes a shift of the burden of proof to the State party in situations 
in which it is impossible for the Court—and nearly impossible for the appli-
cant—to establish the facts, e.g., in cases concerning ill-treatment in prison 
or forced disappearances.146 Finally, at the international criminal tribunals, 
the prosecution bears the burden of proof, and conviction requires proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.147
141. Caroline E. Foster, New Clothes for the Emperor? Consultation of Experts by the 
International Court of Justice, 5 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT. 139, 145 (2014).
142. See GRANDO, supra note 136, at 340 (with particular reference to SPS disputes).
143. Oil Platforms (Iran v. US), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 90, ¶ 57 (Nov. 6).
144. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep.
639, ¶54 (Nov. 30). 
145. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven 
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 14, WTO Doc. WT/DS33/AB/R (adopted May 23, 
1997).
146. See, e.g., Akkum v. Turkey, 2005-??????????????????????????????????????????????????
Turkey, App. No. 27601/95, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 95 (2005), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
69214; Bazorkina v. Russia, App. No. 69481/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 110 (2006), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-76493.
147. For the ICC, this burden is set out in the court’s statute, while at the ICTY and 
ICTR, this standard was adopted by the judges.
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These differences in judicial articulations of burden of proof and stand-
ard of proof by different courts surely reflect, in part, the different types of 
cases heard, with individual criminal liability cases involving particularly 
high burdens of proof. In addition, Judge Higgins suggested that the ICJ’s 
reluctance to articulate a clear standard of proof “is caused by the gap be-
tween the explicit standard-setting approach of the common law and the ‘in-
time conviction du juge’ familiar under civil law.”148
To be sure, one can appreciate the importance of evidentiary burdens 
without the use of practice theory, and burden-shifting can be analyzed in 
straightforward doctrinal terms. Practice theory is a useful supplement to 
more conventional analyses of these issues insofar as it highlights that the 
allocation of evidentiary burdens frequently results from judicial practices 
that are often not mandated by statute or procedural law, but which reflect 
shared norms and background knowledge among the judges at each court.
g. Judicial Practices Regarding Deliberations and Opinion-Writing
International judicial deliberations and opinion-writing are character-
ized by a wide range of judicial practices across different courts, ranging 
from interpretative strategies to citation practices to the use or non-use of 
dissenting and separate opinions. For current purposes, we limit ourselves to 
a discussion of selected deliberation and opinion-writing practices at the 
ICJ, with occasional brief mention of practices at other courts.149 We engage 
in a comparative analysis of opinion-writing practices in Part IV, with a de-
tailed analysis of the use (and non-use) of separate and dissenting opinions 
at the CJEU and ECtHR.
Following the close of oral hearings, ICJ judges meet privately for a 
brief exchange of preliminary views. Thereafter, the President circulates a 
written list of the issues that he or she thinks should be addressed in the 
judgment. Each judge then prepares a written “note” outlining his or her 
tentative views regarding how the case should be resolved. These “notes” 
typically contain “considerable studies of the issues and the law involved in 
the entire case” and often amount to “several score of pages.”150 The notes 
are anonymized and distributed to the other judges.
148. Rosalyn Higgins, The Judicial Determination of Relevant Facts, Speech to the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly (Nov. 2, 2007), in ROSALYN HIGGINS, THEMES AND 
THEORIES 1369, 1374 (2009) (referring to a civil law standard based upon the “intimate” or 
“personal” conviction of the judge).
149. The discussion that follows is drawn largely from the Resolution Concerning the 
Internal Judicial Practice of the Court, I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 6, at 174; THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: HANDBOOK (6th ed. 2014); ROBERT KOLB, THE ELGAR 
COMPANION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 216 (2014). These practices are 
largely unchanged since the time of the Court’s founding.
150. Sir Robert Jennings, The Internal Judicial Practice of the International Court of 
Justice, LIX BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 31, 39 (1988).
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Preliminarily, we note three implications of the practice of preparing 
and circulating notes prior to deliberation (a practice not followed by other 
international courts). First, the practice of having each judge prepare a de-
tailed analysis of each issue ensures that all of the judges “study the materi-
als before them, that they are familiar with the views of their colleagues, 
and that [the subsequent] deliberations are a true judicial dialogue . . . .”151
Second, the notes provide an initial impression of where a preliminary ma-
jority of judges may lie on each issue before the court. They therefore help 
judges identify lines of argument to pursue in deliberations. Third, the pro-
cess of having researched and drafted a detailed note helps judges crystal-
lize and refine their individual positions regarding the issues raised by the 
case. In this sense, notes can also serve as the basis for an individual opinion 
if the judge is in a minority.
After reviewing one another’s notes, the judges meet to deliberate. At 
this meeting, each judge speaks, beginning with any judges ad hoc and pro-
ceeding in inverse order of seniority, from most junior to most senior. After 
each intervention, discussion follows regarding how the comments impact 
the rationale underlying the judgment. The seriatim interventions and ensu-
ing discussions thus serve to hone the judgment’s arguments and content. 
The President speaks last and indicates his view of the arguments and ra-
tionales that enjoy majority support. At the conclusion of this process, 
which might span several meetings, the main lines of argument are identi-
fied.
At this point, a three-person drafting committee is formed,152 which pre-
pares and circulates a draft judgment. Other judges can offer suggestions for 
consideration by the drafting committee, which then circulates a revised 
draft judgment.153 The revised draft receives a “first reading,” which consists 
of a paragraph-by-paragraph review of the text. A member of the drafting 
committee will explain each paragraph, and a general conversation follows, 
with judges offering changes and amendments. The first reading provides 
the opportunity “for an examination in depth and detail of the draft, by the 
whole Court.”154 After the first reading, which often spans several meetings, 
judges who wish to deliver separate or dissenting opinions are identified.
An amended draft is then distributed to the judges and given a second 
reading, where it is adopted with or without amendments. At the end of the 
second reading, a final vote is taken on the operative part of the judgment. 
On each point, each judge orally votes “yes” or “no,” in order of inverse 
151. GLEIDER I. HERNÁNDEZ, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE 
JUDICIAL FUNCTION 106 (2014).
152. Two members are elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the judges 
present. The third member is the President, unless he or she is in the minority, in which case 
the Vice President will join the committee.
153. The drafting process is described in Resolution Concerning the Internal Judicial 
Practice of the Court , supra note 149, at 176–179, art. 6.
154. Jennings, supra note 150, at 42.
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seniority, and the decision on each issue is taken by absolute majority of the 
judges present.
There are several notable features of this process. First, this highly la-
bor- and time-intensive process is not required by the ICJ Statute. Rather, 
the multi-stage process reflects a set of practices developed and refined over 
the years by the judges themselves. While judges have periodically re-
viewed and tweaked this process (e.g., in 1931, 1936, 1946, 1968, 1976, 
1998, and 2002), its essence remains unchanged since the time of the 
PCIJ.155
The modalities of deliberation are the result of judicial practice, rather 
than treaty rule, at most other international courts as well. Thus, at the 
WTO, the AB members themselves developed a system for deliberation that 
uniquely involves not only the three AB members assigned to the case, but 
also the other four members of the AB. Once again, the WTO DSU did not 
require this innovation, but the founding members of the AB developed it, 
and it has persisted since then. Likewise, judges at the CJEU, ECtHR, ICC, 
and other international tribunals developed their own practices regarding 
judicial deliberation and opinion-drafting, and these vary dramatically 
across courts.
Second, the processes of deliberation and opinion-writing at the ICJ, as 
well as at other international courts, can be fruitfully understood as a “prac-
tice,” as the term is used by Adler and Pouliot. ICJ drafting procedures con-
stitute a sustained and highly patterned set of activities that take place 
against the backdrop of shared background understandings. Numerous as-
pects of these procedures have substantial performative aspects, including 
the seriatim articulation of positions during deliberations, the advocacy for 
or against certain doctrinal claims, and the oral voting for or against each 
paragraph of the dispositif. The content and form of the judicial opinion 
likewise have performative aspects. The judicial opinion is the public face 
of the Court. The Court majority self-consciously crafts the judgment’s 
structure and content to convey judicial authority and persuade readers of its 
legal analysis.
In addition, although these activities are shaped by structure and are 
highly patterned, there is ample room for the exercise of agency regarding 
both process and substance. Regarding process, the judges maintain flexibil-
ity over and can modify procedures. For example, ICJ judges reserve the 
right to dispense with the note-drafting process in preliminary stages of pro-
ceedings.156 And, on substance, each judge exercises discretion in consider-
ing which arguments to urge upon his or her judicial colleagues and how 
they can best be framed.
Judges can undertake these deliberative and opinion-writing practices 
more or less competently. Judicial opinions are evaluated and judged by the 
155. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 151, at 104.
156. Bardo Fassbender, Article 54, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY, supra note 123, at 1173 n.13.
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conventions of the genre.157 Any particular opinion will contain more or less 
elaborate reasoning, more or less artfully describe and distinguish previous 
cases, and do a better or worse job of applying the law to the facts before it. 
Opinions are subject to intensive scrutiny by other judges, the invisible col-
lege of international lawyers, and broader publics along these and related 
metrics.158
Third, the ICJ decision-making practices evidence a “strong preference 
for the active participation of every judge both in the deliberations and in 
the formulation of judgments.”159 The Court’s rather formal and structured 
deliberations reflect the principle that “the judgment or opinion of the Court 
is always the result of the work of all its members.”160 Rather remarkably, 
ICJ deliberation and opinion-writing practices result in dissenting judges 
working with their colleagues to improve and clarify the Court’s judgment. 
This collaborative process runs in the other direction as well, as separate 
opinions are circulated after the first reading and are thereafter discussed in 
deliberations, often prompting changes in both the majority and separate 
opinions. As a result, “the whole Court is much involved in the separate, 
even in dissenting, opinions, just as the judges making separate opinions are 
all the time involved in the Court’s own decision.”161
By contrast with the ICJ, many other international courts, particularly 
those with higher caseloads such as the AB, CJEU, and ECtHR, proceed
very differently, with “chambers” of various sizes (but consisting of fewer 
than all members of the court) deciding the vast majority of cases. Such 
courts vary considerably among themselves, however, on whether their de-
liberative processes make it more or less likely for the final judgment or 
opinion to reflect the thinking of all the judges. For example, WTO AB 
members developed a unique practice called the “exchange of views,” 
where the “division” of three AB members assigned to the dispute meet 
with the other four AB members, who examine the full record of the case, 
and all AB members discuss the issues raised by the case. While only the 
members of the division are responsible for drafting the AB report, the ex-
change of views provides each AB member an opportunity to express her 
157. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as a Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 201, 202 (1990).
158. Important judgments are often the subject of monographs, edited volumes, or sym-
posia. See, e.g., THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE KOSOVO ADVISORY OPINION (Marko Mila-
??????????????????????????????????INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 
1999); Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Con-
struction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005).
159. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 151, at 105.
160. Jennings, supra note 150, at 43.
161. Id. To be sure, the time-consuming and labor-intensive practices employed by the 
ICJ reflect, in part, the Court’s relatively light docket. The number of cases at the ECtHR and 
WTO AB would preclude using similar procedures. 
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views, and these exchanges “maximize[ ] the consistency and coherence of 
the jurisprudence.”162
More commonly, however, deliberation practices are not designed to 
ensure that judicial opinions reflect the views of the entire bench. At both 
the CJEU and the ECtHR, the first drafts of opinions are prepared by a sin-
gle judge rapporteur, and although there are deliberations among the mem-
bers of the chamber, the final opinion often bears the strong influence of the 
judge rapporteur, and other members of the court, outside the chamber, are 
not included in the process of deliberation or drafting.163
Fourth, and relatedly, the ICJ’s inclusive deliberative and opinion-
writing practices, like all practices, convey a “social meaning.” In particular, 
they reflect a judicial understanding that, to be effective, the ICJ must be a 
“world court” in its decision-making processes as well as in its composition. 
From this perspective, judicial practices intended to ensure that the entire 
bench fully participates in all aspects of the deliberation and drafting of a 
judgment are not simply techniques intended to improve the quality of the 
Court’s judgment. Rather, these inclusive practices communicate that the 
Court’s judgments reflect a bench that is “universalist in its composition, 
outlook and vocation, truly representing and at the service of the interna-
tional community in its entirety, and not dominated by the legal or social 
culture or special interests of any segment thereof.”164 In short, these prac-
tices are intended to ensure that “the Court and its judgments command the 
confidence of all the nations of the world.”165
* * *
This incomplete and partial overview provides a sense of the range and 
number of international judicial practices. For now, we draw attention to 
two features of these activities. First, these activities exhibit the characteris-
tics of practices as identified by Adler and Pouliot. In particular, they have a 
marked performative dimension, most visibly in the oral proceedings, but 
also in the privacy of deliberations, in the making of extrajudicial pro-
nouncements, and in the rhetorical style and argumentative techniques of 
the judicial opinion. These practices are strongly patterned, as they regularly 
and repeatedly occur within the litigation context and yet permit judges to 
exercise considerable agency. These practices can be, and are, performed 
more or less competently, as ascertained by the relevant communities of 
practice. Thus, over time, international judges develop reputations for their 
abilities to craft arguments, draft opinions, or manage a trial courtroom. The 
162. Georges Abi-Saab, Comment, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ROOM 
FOR INNOVATIONS? 13, 16 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Ina Gätzschmann eds., 2013).
163. NINA-LOUISA AROLD, THE LEGAL CULTURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 75 (2007).
164. Abi-Saab, supra note 90, at 3.
165. Id.
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practices rest upon, and instantiate, background knowledge of international 
law as well as tacit norms of appropriate judicial behavior. And, finally, 
these practices implicate both discursive and material realms. Judicial dia-
logue and opinions are discursive practices that have substantial material 
ramifications for litigants and potentially other actors as well.
Second, these practices vary across international tribunals in quite sig-
nificant ways. Although international courts engage in similar tasks—
namely, the interpretation of authoritative legal text to determine if one ac-
tor breached the legal rights of another—courts perform these tasks in sub-
stantially different ways. This variation underscores our commitment to a 
study of comparative international judicial practice.
Of course, many international judicial practices are unofficial and often 
unpublicized. Many of the most important practices occur in the private 
confines of the judges’ chambers and are therefore inherently difficult to 
identify and analyze. Thus, any claim for the centrality of judicial practices 
to the functioning of international courts inescapably raises the question of 
how one studies international judicial practices, the subject to which we now 
turn.
III. Epistemology and Methodology
in the Study of International Legal Practices
Thus far, we have introduced practice theory and provided a synoptic 
overview of international judicial practices. These discussions raise im-
portant questions of epistemology and methodology. While the study of in-
ternational legal texts (such as treaties or judicial decisions) presents con-
siderable challenges, by and large the texts themselves are readily available. 
By contrast, “practice is perfectly happy to stay in the background, support-
ing our daily commerce in the world without the need to come under the 
spotlight.”166 The empirical study of practice, therefore, raises a series of in-
terrelated questions concerning how best to access, interpret, and understand 
social practices that comprise often hidden behaviors.
Practice theorists do not speak with one voice on these questions of 
epistemology and methodology. Some authors believe that the study of 
practices is consistent with a broad range of epistemological and methodo-
logical approaches. Adler and Pouliot, for example, claim that one of prac-
tice theory’s virtues is its ability to accommodate multiple ontological, epis-
temological, and methodological views and approaches.167 Other scholars 
associate practice theory with a particular set of epistemological and meth-
odological “commitments.” For example, Bueger and Gadinger argue that 
practice theory necessarily entails a commitment to an interpretivist, rather 
166. NICOLINI, supra note 26, at 217.
167. Introduction and Framework, supra note 34, at 14–15.
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than a positivist, epistemology.168 Meierhenrich similarly argues in favor of 
an interpretivist epistemology and an ethnographic methodology. In this 
view, “practice theorists are not interested in developing theories as conven-
tionally understood in positivist social science, that is, as testable proposi-
tions that explain classes of events in the pursuit of generalization.”169 In-
stead, the goal of the interpretivist epistemology associated with practice 
approaches is to uncover the meanings that practitioners attach to their ac-
tions. In Meierhenrich’s words, “[i]n order to truly grasp international law, 
in the Weberian sense of achieving an ‘empathetic understanding’ thereof, 
we have no choice but to enter, as deeply as we can, the webs of signifi-
cance that practitioners spin.”170
Moving from epistemology to methodology, Meierhenrich calls on re-
searchers to leave their academic offices and undertake ethnographic field-
work. Specifically, he urges scholars to engage in “shadowing[,]” following 
practitioners in their day-to-day activities, and views this as a useful tech-
nique for producing thick, contextual understandings of specific practices.171
A “focus on the micropolitics of international law,” Meierhenrich argues, 
“will, at a minimum, generate more fine-grained empirical observations
than can be collected from hundreds or thousands of miles away and by way 
of what, not infrequently, are crude quantitative indicators.”172
Meierhenrich’s approach is in many ways representative of practice 
theorists more generally, e.g., in its epistemological rejection of positivism 
and embrace of interpretivism and in its commitment to ethnography as the 
most appropriate methodology with which to study practices.173 These 
methods, however, are of limited utility in contexts where access is partial 
and limited. These limits of ethnography and participant observation are 
particularly clear in the study of international courts, many of whose most 
important activities take place in non-public settings. By statute and tradi-
tion, international courts are bound to deliberate in secret, and much of the 
business of international courts is similarly conducted in private. Academic 
observers, therefore, are unlikely to be able to “shadow” judges through 
more than a fraction of their work lives. For this reason, we argue, students 
of international legal and judicial practices are called upon to be more 
catholic in their epistemological and methodological stances.
We agree with the claim that the study of practices involves some de-
gree of interpretation in order to identify the intersubjective norms and 
background knowledge that inform judicial practices, and the meanings that 
practitioners, including judges, assign to their own and others’ behaviors. 
168. Bueger & Gadinger, supra note 20, at 457. 
169. Meierhenrich, supra note 68, at 3 n.9.
170. Id. at 28.
171. Id. at 77.
172. Id. at 71.
173. See, e.g., Bueger & Gadinger, supra note 20, at 457 (urging participant observa-
tion).
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That said, however, we disagree with the further claim that the study of 
practices necessarily entails a rejection of social scientific positivism, with 
its aims of causal explanation and generalization. We argue that interpretive 
efforts to understand intersubjectively shared norms as well as subjective 
motivations of actors are consistent with the positivist project of explaining 
the causes and consequences of particular practices and generalizing those 
explanations through inference beyond the immediate objects of study. Put 
simply, we do not accept that there exists a stark “either-or” choice between 
interpretive understanding on the one hand, and positivist explanation on the 
other hand, although we recognize that, in practice, any particular study will 
face trade-offs between these two potential aims of scholarship. We believe, 
instead, that scholars can undertake closely observed studies of international 
courts that seek both to do justice to the distinctiveness of each case and to 
formulate and test generalizable, causal claims about practices across cases.
In methodological terms, because direct ethnographic or participant ob-
servation of many international legal practices may be impossible, interna-
tional legal scholars would be wise to adopt a multi-method approach, in 
which practices are accessed and interpreted through a variety of methods 
and sources. These may include ethnographic direct observation, but are al-
so likely to rely on other methods and sources, including ethnographic or 
semi-structured interviewing with practitioners and examination of a broad 
range of texts, including international legal agreements, travaux prépa-
ratoires, judicial opinions, and archival and biographical materials.174
Particularly controversial in this regard is the use of interviews to at-
tempt to recreate practices that cannot be directly accessed by researchers. 
Interpretivists note that, while practitioners might be able to recount, or rep-
resent, to an interviewer the material and social nature of practices after the 
fact, respondents’ accounts may suffer from poor or incomplete recall, or 
even dishonesty, and are thus inferior to the direct observation and “insider” 
perspective afforded by participant observation.175 And for positivists—who 
seek to test hypotheses about causal relationships often on the basis of sta-
tistical analysis of large, random data samples—interviews raise fundamen-
tal questions about selection, validity, and reliability. Despite these reserva-
tions, a growing number of interpretivist scholars acknowledge that 
ethnographic and semi-structured interviews can provide a valuable window 
onto otherwise unobservable practices, as well as the meanings that actors 
174. Id. (where participant observation is impossible, scholars should use interviews and 
textual or survey analysis to reconstruct practices or map social and professional fields); see 
also NICOLINI, supra note 26, at 213–40 (advocating an eclectic “tool kit” approach employ-
ing multiple methods and sources). 
175. Layna Mosley, “Just Talk to People”? Interviews in Contemporary Political Sci-
ence, in INTERVIEW RESEARCH IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1, 11 (Layna Mosley ed., 2013) 
(“[I]nterview data has its limitations: it does not allow for immersion, nor for the ‘insider’
perspective that is a hallmark of ethnographic approaches.”). 
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attribute to those practices.176 A growing body of political science scholar-
ship has accordingly begun to explore and establish best practices for the 
use of interview research, alongside other sources, to understand the causes 
and consequences of such practices.177
In the next section, we employ a multi-method approach to identify the 
material and ideational elements of international judicial practices surround-
ing judicial dissent, as well as international judges’ intersubjective under-
standings of these practices.
IV. The Practice of Dissent:
The Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts Compared
In Part II of this paper, we provided a typology of international judicial 
practices and noted that courts differ dramatically in terms of one such prac-
tice: the publication of separate dissenting or concurring opinions alongside 
a court’s collective judgment. At some courts, including the CJEU, judges
deliberate and vote in strict secrecy, issue collective decisions on behalf of 
the court, and never issue separate dissenting or concurring opinions. At 
other courts, including the ICJ, virtually all judgments are accompanied by 
multiple dissenting and concurring opinions. Still other courts, including the 
ECtHR and the WTO’s AB, occupy intermediate points on this continuum.
In this section, we use this variation across different international courts 
as a vehicle to illustrate the utility of studying judicial practices. Specifical-
ly, we analyze dissent practices of two of the busiest and most influential 
international courts: the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxem-
bourg and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. These two 
European courts are often mentioned in the same breath as “supranational” 
courts that feature direct or indirect access by individuals, activist jurispru-
dence, and high compliance rates.178Yet for all their similarities, the two Eu-
ropean courts adopted strikingly different practices with respect to dissent, 
which is commonplace at the ECtHR but entirely absent from the CJEU.
From a purely behavioral perspective, the contrast between the Luxem-
bourg and Strasbourg courts is clear and measurable. A study of judicial 
practices requires us to dig deeper, however, to understand the day-to-day 
workings of both courts, the intersubjectively shared norms that undergird 
and help to reproduce each court’s practices, and the subjective perceptions 
and motivations of the judges. In light of the epistemological and methodo-
176. See Robert S. Weiss, In Their Own Words: Making the Most of Qualitative Inter-
views, 3 CONTEXTS 44, 45 (Fall 2004); see also ROBERT S. WEISS, LEARNING FROM 
STRANGERS: THE ART AND METHOD OF QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW STUDIES (1994); JAMES P.
SPRADLEY, THE ETHNOGRAPHIC INTERVIEW (1979).
177. See, e.g., Dunoff & Pollack, INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 
57–70; INTERVIEW RESEARCH IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 175 passim. 
178. Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supra-
national Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
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logical issues discussed in the previous section, we have undertaken a multi-
method study of these practices, including review of primary legal materials 
such as Statutes and Rules of Court, judgments from both courts, off-the-
bench writings of judges, and a series of semi-structured interviews with 
current and former judges.179
To preview our findings, at the ECtHR, we find a material practice of 
relatively frequent dissent, undergirded by intersubjectively shared norms 
that are highly permissive and even encouraging of dissent, subject only to 
very broad norms about appropriate length and tone of separate opinions. 
We also find a widespread belief among Strasbourg judges that the practice 
of dissent increases the legitimacy of the court and the quality of its case 
law, without endangering judicial collegiality or independence. At the 
CJEU, by contrast, we find a long-standing material practice of suppressing 
dissent, coupled to a strong norm of consensus decision-making, whereby 
judges pride themselves on deliberating and reasoning collectively rather 
than breaking apart to compose separate opinions. Luxembourg judges, 
moreover, nearly unanimously believe that their de facto ban on public dis-
sent increases judicial collegiality, legitimacy, and, above all, independence, 
although some concede that the search for consensus can sometimes com-
promise the clarity of the Court’s legal reasoning.
A. The European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights was established by the European 
Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) in 1950, began operations in 1959, 
and has grown today to a 47-member body whose annual caseload is greater 
than that of any other international court.180 The Court enjoys compulsory 
jurisdiction over claims that member states have violated the ECHR and a 
right of individual petition from private litigants. Like the CJEU examined 
below, the Strasbourg court is considered a powerful and frequently activist 
body whose judges interpret the Convention as a “living instrument” and 
expanded the meaning of the Convention’s core rights beyond those intend-
179. Specifically, we interviewed eight current and former CJEU judges, and eight cur-
rent and former ECtHR judges, over a period from December 2014 to July 2016. All judges 
interviewed in this study were promised anonymity in our interviews with them. We therefore 
denote these judges as Judges S1 through S8 for our Strasbourg/ECtHR interview subjects, 
and L1 through L8 for our Luxembourg/CJEU subjects. At both courts, we interviewed a mix 
of judges from civil- and common-law countries and from western and eastern Europe, and a 
mix of female and male judges; hence, while not strictly representative, our samples include a 
range of variation across several important dimensions. To preserve the anonymity of the 
judges, we refer to all of our interview subjects using the male pronoun he, reflecting the large 
majority of male judges on both courts. 
180. For a good general introduction, see generally ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A 
PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010).
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ed by the founders.181 Unlike the CJEU, however, ECtHR judges have, from 
the earliest days of the Court, engaged in the frequent practice of adopting 
separate, public dissenting and concurring opinions. Between 1959 and 
April 2001, the Court issued just over 2,000 judgments, of which 602, or 
roughly 30 percent, were accompanied by one or more dissenting or concur-
ring opinions.182
In this section, we explore both the material manifestations of this judi-
cial practice, as well as the intersubjective norms and subjective motivations 
of the Strasbourg judges. This discussion draws upon primary source mate-
rials (e.g., the 1950 Convention, the travaux preparatoires, subsequent Pro-
tocols amending the Convention, and Rules of Court), off-the-bench writ-
ings of judges, secondary literature on the Court, and our own semi-
structured interviews with current and former ECtHR judges. As we shall 
see, these sources reveal a highly permissive attitude toward dissent, subject 
to informal norms about the length and respectful tenor of such opinions.
1. Statute, Procedural Law, and Practice
Both the Convention and the Court were products of post-war Europe: 
the first formal proposal for a European human rights convention came from 
the European Movement, whose members issued a draft Convention and a 
draft statute for a European court of human rights in December 1948.183 This 
proposal was then taken up by the Parliamentary Assembly of the newly 
founded Council of Europe, which pressed the member states to negotiate 
and ultimately adopt a watered-down version of the European Movement’s 
proposal in November 1950.184 The negotiation of the Convention proved to 
be highly contentious, with controversy centering upon the specific list of 
rights to be protected as well as on the design of the Court.185
181. Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The 
European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and 
Politics, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 137 (2007).
182. AROLD, supra note 163, at 91 n.249. Interestingly, these patterns did not signifi-
cantly change in the aftermath of Protocol 11. Erik Voeten, examining a comprehensive da-
taset of all cases decided between 1960 and 2006, reports dissent rates according to the 
Court’s three-level scale of legal significance, with judgments of level 1 making a significant 
contribution to ECtHR case law, while level 3 judgments are straightforward applications of 
existing case law. He found that 6% of level 3 judgments, 26% of level 2 judgments, and 53% 
of level 1 judgments were accompanied by at least one separate opinion. Voeten, Impartiality,
supra note 79, at 425. 
183. European Movement, Draft Convention on Human Rights and draft Statute of the 
European Court of Human Rights prepared by the International Juridical Section of the Eu-
ropean Movement and submitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
12 July 1949, reproduced in 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE ‘TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES’ OF 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 296 (1975) [hereinafter TRAVAUX].
184. BATES, supra note 180, at 58–62.
185. TRAVAUX, supra note 183, at xxiv.
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For current purposes, the most interesting questions in the negotiation 
of the Convention concern the design of the proposed Court. The European 
Movement proposal called for a strong court with compulsory jurisdiction 
over member states and a right for individuals who exhausted domestic 
remedies to file claims against the member governments.186 These features 
would prove controversial in the subsequent negotiations, with a number of 
member states opposing the creation of any court at all.187 In the end, both 
compulsory jurisdiction and individual petition were made optional through 
opt-in clauses in the treaty.188 Outside of these two controversial areas, the 
Court’s Statute was “modelled, with the minimum of adaptation, on [that of] 
the International Court of Justice.”189 In particular, the provision for judicial 
dissent was drawn verbatim from the ICJ Statute and provides that “[i]f the 
judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of 
the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.”190 Judg-
ing from the travaux of the Convention, it appears that this provision was 
not controversial, and it has remained essentially unchanged over the years.
As is often the case, however, the text of court statutes and procedural 
law cannot alone explain judicial practices. The ECHR authorizes judges to 
issue separate opinions, but does not require them to do so or indicate how, 
or how frequently, they will do so. The statutes of many other courts feature 
similar language, yet judges of many of those courts have adopted the prac-
tice of offering separate opinions only rarely. Constitutional court judges in 
most European states, for example, are statutorily authorized to issue dis-
sents, yet many of these courts operate under informal norms that reserve 
dissent only to cases of profound disagreement with the majority, and in 
practice, these judges issue separate opinions in fewer than 10 percent of all 
judgments.191 At the international level, the WTO’s DSU explicitly author-
izes AB members to dissent anonymously from majority decisions, yet the 
first AB members adopted rules of procedure explicitly discouraging public 
dissent, and dissents are quite rare.192
186. See, e.g., BATES, supra note 180, at 56–58.
187. TRAVAUX, supra note 183, at 242–44.
188. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. In time, the various member states of the 
Council gradually accepted both compulsory jurisdiction and the right of individual petition, 
which were made mandatory in Protocol 11, which entered into force in 1998; Protocol No. 
11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Re-
structuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, arts. 32, 34, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. 
155.
189. TRAVAUX, supra note 183, at 121 (quoting Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe).
190. ECHR, supra note 188, art. 51, ¶ 2.
191. ROSA RAFFAELLI, DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, PE 462.470,
DISSENTING OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE MEMBER STATES (2012); Katalin 
Kelemen, Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts, 14 GERMAN L.J. 1345 (2013). 
192. Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, The WTO Appellate Body’s Decision-Making Process: A 
Perfect Model for International Adjudication?, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 289 (2009). 
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Despite these possibilities, the first ECtHR judges did not opt for such 
an approach, but instead adopted Rules of Court that hewed closely to the 
text of the Convention and to the practice of the ICJ, providing in Rule 
50(2) that “[a]ny judge who has taken part in the consideration of the case 
shall be entitled to annex to the judgment either a separate opinion, concur-
ring or dissenting with that judgment, or a bare statement of dissent.”193
Here again, the Rules are permissive, allowing but not requiring separate 
opinions. Hence, to understand dissent practices at the ECtHR, we need to 
look beyond the Convention and Rules of Court to the informal “second-
order” norms that govern the Court’s operations, as well as the considera-
tions that prompt “first-order” decisions of judges to issue separate opinions 
in any given case.194
2. Norms of Dissent
In terms of second-order norms, all of the judges we interviewed indi-
cated that there does not exist at the Court a strong norm against dissent, as 
at the German Constitutional Court and the WTO’s AB. To the contrary, the 
most commonly expressed view is that judges who vote against the majority 
should explain publicly the reasons for their votes, and also that judges who 
disagree with the reasoning in a majority opinion should feel free to issue a 
concurring opinion.195 As one judge recounted:
I was told when I arrived here that I’m obliged at least to have a short 
declaration that I did not vote with the majority, so that for the outside 
world it is clear that if it is 6 to 1, who is the one. So you are under an obli-
gation to declare that, and you are under a moral obligation to give reasons 
in the dissent.196
Other judges interpreted the norm more liberally, suggesting that judges 
were entitled, but not legally or morally obliged, to issue a separate opinion 
where they disagreed with the majority.197 In any event, all of the judges we 
interviewed indicated that they issued separate opinions whenever they dis-
agreed with the majority, that there is no stigma attached to issuing separate 
193. Council of Europe, Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights (1959).
194. In adopting this terminology, we follow Kevin M. Stack, The Practice of Dissent in 
the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235 (1996).
195. Interviews with Judges S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5. Our findings thus agree with those 
of Robin C.A. White & Iris Boussiakou, Separate Opinions in the European Court of Human 
Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 37, 39 (“Although the ability to annex a separate opinion is ex-
pressed in the Convention as permissive, the tradition of the Strasbourg Court is very much 
that those dissenting will file an opinion setting out the reasons for their dissent. Equally, 
many judges clearly take the view that differences in reasoning which lead to the same con-
clusion as that of the Court in its judgment should also be articulated.”).
196. Interview with Judge S2. 
197. Interview with Judge S3.
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opinions, and that judges feel free to write separately on large or small mat-
ters of law or fact.198
Supplementing this highly permissive norm about writing separately 
were secondary norms that separate opinions should be brief and should be 
respectful of both the Court and the majority.199 We were also told that judg-
es who engage in particularly frequent and lengthy separate opinions are 
likely to come in for opprobrium from their fellow judges.200
3. Deciding to Dissent
Previous studies identify several, mostly weak, patterns in ECtHR judg-
es’ dissent practices.201 First, despite the expectation that common law judg-
es would dissent more readily than their civil law brethren, existing studies 
provide no evidence for such an effect.202 Second, there seems to be some 
influence of prior career trajectory, with judges from academic backgrounds 
being more inclined to issue separate dissenting or concurring opinions than 
judges from practitioner backgrounds.203 Third, national judges are more 
likely, and ad hoc judges dramatically more likely, than other judges to dis-
sent against a majority decision that finds a violation in their member state 
of origin.204 Fourth, separate opinions are considerably more common in 
Grand Chamber judgments than in regular chamber judgments, which could 
be a function of either the larger number of judges (17 judges in Grand 
198. “I’m not afraid of writing a short separate opinion saying that the majority opin-
ion is not according to the law the way I see it. The issue doesn’t necessarily have to be of big 
importance. Such short opinions are usually of the concurring type.” Interview with Judge S1.
199. “Now the idea is that the separate opinions should have a reasonable length – what-
ever this means, that’s up to the judge. It should be written in a respectful tone to the majori-
ty.” Interview with Judge S2.
200. Interviews with Judges S2, S3 and S4.
201. Previous studies of separate opinions at the ECtHR include: Fred J. Bruinsma, The
Room at the Top: Separate Opinions in the Grand Chambers of the ECHR (1998?2006), 2008 
ANCILLA IURIS 32 [hereinafter Bruinsma, Room at the Top]; Fred J. Bruinsma & Matthijs de 
Blois, Rules of Law from Westport to Wladiwostok. Separate Opinions in the European Court 
of Human Rights, 15 NETH. Q. HUM. RIGHTS 175 (1997); FLORENCE RIVIÈRE, LES OPINIONS 
SÉPARÉES DES JUGES À LA COUR EUROPÉENE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME (2004); MARTENS 
DISSENTING: THE SEPARATE OPINIONS OF A EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JUDGE (W.E. Haak 
et al. eds., 2000); White & Boussiakou, supra note 195; and Voeten, Impartiality, supra note 
79.
202. Voeten, Impartiality, supra note 79, at 426–29 (finding no difference between civil 
and common law judges in their tendency to dissent in favor of defendant states). Bruinsma, 
however, finds that, in a sample of Grand Chamber cases from 1998 to 2006, judges from the 
former Soviet-bloc states of central and eastern Europe dissent less frequently than judges 
appointed in respect of the “old” member states. Bruinsma, Room at the Top, supra note 201,
at 32.
203. White & Boussiakou, supra note 195, at 46.
204. Voeten, Impartiality, supra note 79, at 425; Bruinsma, Room at the Top, supra note 
201, at 35–36.
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Chambers versus seven in chambers), the inherently greater controversy as-
sociated with cases that go to Grand Chamber, or both.205
Our interviews with present and former judges provide an important 
supplement to this scholarship, reinforcing the literature’s findings in some 
areas and adding fundamentally new insights in others. Among our inter-
viewees, we find a remarkably consistent and vivid sense of the considera-
tions that judges take into account when deciding whether to write separate-
ly, including the role of legal tradition, the impact of workload, and the 
intended audiences for such decisions.
Legal Tradition. One common supposition is that judges from common 
law backgrounds would dissent much more readily and frequently than 
judges from civil law backgrounds.206 The judges we interviewed, however, 
were skeptical that legal tradition significantly shaped the dissent practices 
of ECtHR judges. One judge observed that some of the great dissenters in 
the Court’s history came from civil law traditions and noted that many civil 
law judges, presented with the possibility to dissent, took to the practice 
“like ducks to water.”207 Another judge explained the apparently weak influ-
ence of national legal traditions by pointing out that individuals who join the 
Court are typically experts in European human rights law, familiar with the 
Court’s jurisprudence, and hence intimately acquainted with the Court’s 
long tradition of frequent separate opinions. Given this background, even 
judges whose previous experience did not include writing separately tend to 
come to the Court acquainted with its practices and ready to participate in 
them.208
Workload and Time Pressure. The empirical literature on dissent in 
U.S. federal courts finds an inverse correlation between judges’ workload 
and the production of separate opinions: ceteris paribus, judges with heavier 
caseloads face greater costs in producing separate opinions and, therefore, 
produce fewer of them.209 The Strasbourg judges likewise expressed the 
view that high caseloads, intense time pressures, and lack of staff support all 
dramatically increase the costs of writing separate opinions. The ECtHR has 
a famously high caseload, including over 63,000 applications considered in 
205. Bruinsma, Room at the Top, supra note 201, at 33 (finding that 1969 to 1997, 78% 
of all Grand Chamber judgments have separate opinions, compared to 42% of Chamber judg-
ments); see also White & Boussiakou, supra note 195, at 50–51 (finding that 72% of all 
Grand Chamber cases between 1999 and 2007 were accompanied by at least one separate 
opinion). 
206. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV.
133 (1990).
207. “It’s true, a lot of them had no tradition of dissent in their own judicial system, but 
some of them took to it likes ducks to water when they got here. Look at the French judges . . .
endless separate opinions, long, wordy. . . . They came from systems where there weren’t such 
separate opinions, but once here, they embraced the opportunity.” Interview with Judge S4.
208. Interview with Judge S3.
209. Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101 (2011). 
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2017. While the vast majority of such petitions are deemed inadmissible, the 
Court delivered a total of 1,068 judgments during the year, including 526 by 
chambers, 523 by committees of three judges, and 19 judgments by the
Grand Chamber.210 Compared to
other international courts, therefore, Strasbourg judges have an ex-
traordinarily high workload, and the writing of individual separate 
opinions in such a large number of cases competes with the judges’ 
other responsibilities.
Furthermore, time limits for the writing of separate opinions are short 
and strictly enforced: judges have only 14 days to prepare separate opinions 
from chamber judgments, and three weeks for Grand Chamber judgments. 
Unlike CJEU judges, Strasbourg judges do not employ their own clerks or 
référendaires, meaning that judges typically draft their own dissents, with 
minimal support from the Registry. By all accounts, therefore, writing sepa-
rate opinions is a high-cost activity for the judges, often undertaken during 
weekends and evenings.211
Yet, despite the disincentives imposed by high caseloads and tight 
deadlines, separate opinions are common at the ECtHR. As noted above, 
notwithstanding time and resource constraints, the Strasbourg judges have 
internalized a norm that motivates them to explain their reasoning when 
they disagree with the majority. These judges have developed strategies for 
addressing workload and time pressures, such as frequent co-authoring of 
separate opinions, as well as the issuance of relatively brief and pointed 
opinions, often only a few pages long, by contrast with the more elaborate 
separate opinions of ICJ judges.
Audiences. Strasbourg judges are very aware of the multiple audiences 
for separate opinions, which vary systematically depending on the judicial 
formation—namely, a seven-judge chamber versus the larger 17-judge 
Grand Chamber. Several judges noted that the primary audiences for a dis-
sent from a Chamber judgment include the litigants and the panel of ECtHR 
judges who will later decide whether to accept an appeal from the Chamber 
judgment. More specifically, a dissenting judge may wish to signal to the 
losing party that an alternative outcome is possible and that they should ap-
peal to the Grand Chamber. A carefully argued dissent, these judges contin-
ued, also serves as a signal to the panel of judges that decide whether to ac-
cept appeals against chamber judgments. These judges suggested that, just 
as the U.S. Supreme Court is more likely to accept certiorari petitions on 
issues that divide the Courts of Appeals,212 so too the panel of Strasbourg 
210. Council of Europe, Annual Report 2017 of the European Court of Human Rights, at 
155, 163, https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/annualreports&c (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2018).
211. Interviews with Judges S1, S2, and S3. 
212. See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 76–
77 (2006).
Fall 2018] International Judicial Practices 97
judges is more likely to accept appeals where the minority demonstrates that 
a serious division exists on an important point of law.213
By contrast, several judges pointed out, the intended audience is likely 
to be different in Grand Chamber cases, from which there is no opportunity 
for appeal. In these cases, judges in the minority are likely to write for dif-
ferent audiences, including future generations of judges, the broader legal 
community, and, at times, the general public.214 The judges also made a 
clear distinction between the intended audiences for dissenting and concur-
ring opinions: while dissents are likely to draw attention, encourage appeals, 
and spark public debate, concurrences typically represent more nuanced dif-
ferences over legal reasoning and are therefore more likely to be addressed 
to members of the attentive legal community (i.e., the relevant community 
of practice).215
4. The Implications of ECtHR Dissent Practices
The practice of judicial dissent is highly controversial. Many argue that 
dissenting opinions have several negative impacts, including on judicial le-
gitimacy (undermined by open divisions among the judges), collegiality 
(weakened by the failure to reason together and by open public disagree-
ments), and independence (by allowing governments to identify the posi-
tions of individual judges and potentially retaliate against them).216 Other 
scholars and judges argue, in contrast, that separate opinions improve the 
quality of jurisprudence by bringing otherwise hidden arguments into the 
open and forcing the majority to address explicitly the concerns and argu-
ments of the minority.217 Our aim is not to adjudicate these competing 
claims, but rather to discover how judges understand the relationship be-
tween their practice of dissent and these other values. Our research reveals 
213. Interviews with Judges S1, S2 and S3. Judge S1: ”Of course, the traditional benefit 
is that the separate opinion might be the start of a development in the other direction. And that 
is definitely true in the case of chamber judgments that might still end up in the Grand Cham-
ber. That is a very useful purpose of a separate opinion: you try to show to the losing par-
ty that there is still a chance to win. It is very common that the losing party relies on the sepa-
rate opinion to ask for a rehearing before the Grand Chamber. The filtering panel of the Grand 
Chamber may then look at the separate opinion and find it interesting to have a confrontation 
of the two opinions before the Grand Chamber.”
214. Interviews with Judges S2, S3 and S7. Judge S2: “Now the situation is completely 
different in the Grand Chamber. There the game is over. And there you write to the party that 
will lose the case, but also to the outside world. And ultimately to this Court, but a future gen-
eration of judges. So the strategy is a little bit different if you’re writing in a Chamber judg-
ment or in the Grand Chamber.”
215. Interview with Judge S3.
216. For a discussion of arguments against dissent offered in the U.S. context, see M. 
Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 
SUP. CT. REV. 283.
217. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 39–42 (1994); 
William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427 (1986).
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that the Strasbourg judges generally believe that the heightened transparen-
cy of a court with open dissent increases the Court’s legitimacy, collegiality, 
and the quality of its jurisprudence without posing a serious threat to judi-
cial independence.218
Legitimacy. Many prominent judges and scholars argue that a unified 
court, ruling per curiam without dissenting votes or voices, serves to in-
crease judicial legitimacy.219 Given their long history of open and frequent 
dissent, Strasbourg judges not surprisingly tend to disagree. Several judges 
we interviewed argued that separate concurring or even dissenting opinions 
can increase the Court’s legitimacy, for example by making clear to losing 
litigants that their concerns were fully considered.220 Others noted that the 
practice of publishing votes and offering separate opinions increases the 
transparency of the Court, arguably an important component of legitima-
cy.221 Separate opinions also allow judges to detail the reasons for their vote, 
thus preemptively addressing potential accusations of politicized or biased 
voting.222
Whether frequent dissents impact the ECtHR’s legitimacy among vari-
ous audiences is an empirical question well beyond this paper’s scope. For 
now, we note that CJEU judges tend to disagree with their Strasbourg coun-
terparts and argue that public shows of unity increase the Court’s public le-
gitimacy.223 We also observe that the relatively high degrees of public ac-
ceptance and support enjoyed by both the CJEU and the ECtHR suggest that 
there may be multiple roads to legitimacy, at least as far as the question of 
dissent is concerned.224
Collegiality and Consensus. Writings on judicial dissent often claim 
that frequent dissents can undermine judicial collegiality, understood both in 
terms of the collegiality of collective deliberation and opinion-writing and 
in the more colloquial sense of interpersonal rapport.225 The Strasbourg 
judges we interviewed drew a sharp distinction between the collegiality of 
218. Cf. White & Boussiakou, supra note 195, at 57 (finding overwhelming support for 
separate opinions in interviews with ECtHR judges).
219. This view is often associated with Chief Justice John Marshall, who suppressed 
dissent in U.S. Supreme Court opinions to enhance the new Court’s legitimacy. See David M. 
O’Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of In-
dividual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST 
APPROACHES 91 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
220. Interviews with Judges S1 and S3. 
221. Interview with Judge S2.
222. Interviews with Judges S1 and S3. 
223. Several judges issued caveats to this general claim, noting that dissenting opinions 
should remain respectful toward the Court, and that closely divided judgments of, say, 9 to 8 
or 10 to 7 (in the Grand Chamber) could potentially damage the legitimacy of the majority 
judgment. Interview with Judge S3. 
224. We explore this issue in more detail in Dunoff & Pollack, supra note 12.
225. For a discussion, see Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial De-
cision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003).
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deliberation and opinion-writing on the one hand, and collegiality of per-
sonal relations on the other. Several judges conceded that the option to write 
separately reduces the incentive for judges to seek consensus in any given 
case. ECtHR chambers, according to these judges, attempt to reach consen-
sus in their initial deliberations, but if it becomes clear that a consensus is 
not possible, then the majority at some point will retire to deliberate and 
draft a judgment, while the dissenters will begin to draft their own opinion 
or opinions.226 Nevertheless, the judges noted, whereas such an outcome 
might be considered a failure in courts with a strong consensus norm, it is 
considered a normal part of the system in Strasbourg and does not necessari-
ly entail any loss of collegiality in interpersonal relations among the judges, 
provided that the resulting dissents are moderate in tone and respectful of 
the majority and of the Court as an institution.227
Legal Reasoning and Style of Judgments. It is a truism in the literature 
on U.S. federal courts that the possibility and practice of dissent results in a 
richer jurisprudence and more carefully reasoned judgments, insofar as mul-
tiple positions are aired and the majority is forced to respond to the minori-
ty’s arguments.228 The Strasbourg judges we interviewed agreed that the 
possibility and practice of writing separately produces decisions that are 
more sharply and decisively reasoned, insofar as the differences among 
judges are exposed and argued in both the Court’s decision and the separate 
opinion, rather than “papered over” in a single, consensus decision.229
Judicial Independence. Perhaps the most challenging question for 
judges is whether and how decisions to write separately might influence 
each judge’s independence vis-à-vis home states. Unlike U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, who enjoy life tenure, the vast majority of international court 
judges serve for renewable terms of between four and nine years.230 As we 
shall see, CJEU judges believe that their six-year renewable terms render 
them potentially susceptible to political pressure from their home govern-
ments, which could potentially punish them for unwelcome decisions by 
failing to re-nominate them for additional terms of office. It is largely for 
this reason, according to many Luxembourg judges, that the CJEU releases 
neither voting records nor separate opinions. For most of its history, judges 
of the Court of Human Rights also served for limited, renewable terms, ini-
tially set at nine years in the 1950 ECHR and then shortened to six years by 
Protocol 11 in 1998. In this context, the decision by Strasbourg judges to 
dissent openly left them open to retaliation from member governments, 
226. Interview with Judge S1.
227. Interviews with Judges S1 and S2.
228. E.g., Brennan, supra note 217.
229. Interviews with Judges S3 and S4; see also RIVIÈRE, supra note 201.
230. For example, WTO AB members serve for four-year terms, and may be reappoint-
ed once, while CJEU judges serve six-year terms, and are eligible for reappointment. ICJ and 
ITLOS judges serve for nine-year terms, and may be reappointed, while ECtHR and ICC 
judges also serve for nine-year terms but are not eligible for reappointment.
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which could refuse to re-nominate judges in retaliation for unwelcome votes 
or opinions.231
Unlike their Luxembourg counterparts, the Strasbourg judges opted to 
publish open and sometimes vociferous separate opinions from the begin-
ning, seemingly unconcerned with the potential reactions of states when it 
was time to renew their terms. By the late 1990s, however, states began to 
retaliate by not re-nominating judges who had delivered adverse judgments 
or separate opinions.232 In response to concerns that this behavior threatened 
judicial independence, the member states agreed in Protocol 14 to the 
ECHR to extend the judges’ terms of office from six to nine years and to 
make these terms non-renewable.233 This reform, which was adopted explic-
itly to protect judicial independence,234 represents the only instance of which 
we are aware of states making a deliberate transition from renewable to non-
renewable terms for international judges.235 It also means that Strasbourg 
judges no longer face the prospect of reappointment when carrying out their 
day-to-day practices of judicial decision-making, unlike their Luxembourg 
counterparts.
The current and former ECtHR judges we interviewed agreed that pre-
Protocol 14 judges were potentially subject to pressures from their home 
states,236 and several expressed satisfaction that they would not face a cam-
paign for reappointment at the end of their terms.237 On the other hand, how-
ever, four of the eight judges we interviewed noted that the elimination of 
renewable terms did not completely eliminate extralegal pressures on judg-
231. Recall that national judges, or ad hoc judges, serve on the chambers deciding each 
and every case filed against a given member state, requiring national judges to take a public, 
individual position on the complaint against their home state. 
232. Voeten, Impartiality, supra note 79, at 421.
233. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention art. 2, May 13, 2004, 
C.E.T.S. No. 194. Article 2 of the Protocol amends Article 23 ECHR, paragraph 1 of which 
now reads, “The judges shall be elected for a period of nine years. They may not be reelect-
ed.”
234. Christina G. Hioureas, Behind the Scenes of Protocol No. 14: Politics in Reforming 
the European Court of Human Rights, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 718, 729 (2006).
235. The most comparable case of which we are aware is the decision of the drafters of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to adopt nine-year, non-renewable terms, 
breaking with the precedent of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, whose judges had enjoyed only four-year renewable terms.
236. Interviews with Judges S2 and S5. In the words of Judge S2, “the pressure on the 
judges was tremendous. And there were incidents where judges were not put up for reelection 
on the candidates of three by the government, and that’s the reason why the system has 
changed.”
237. See, e.g., the comments of Judge S3: “I think the reform was good. I would not like 
to have the six-year renewable term, because then you get it back to party politics. You have 
the right and the left wing, and if you talk about surrogate motherhood or homosexual cou-
ples, these are issues where you have different positions in party politics, so that might be 
used in the context of party politics for reappointment. And I’m happy to stay out of that.”
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es. Many judges, they observed, are sufficiently young that they face the 
prospect of lengthy careers—whether in the judiciary, in government, in ac-
ademia or elsewhere—after the end of their nine-year terms.238 The Protocol 
14 reforms, in this sense, did not entirely eliminate concerns about external 
pressures, since judges might still be concerned about the reception of their 
decisions and opinions “back home”239 and the implications for their future 
careers. Overall, then, judges indicated that the switch to non-renewable 
terms indeed made it easier to vote and dissent (or join the majority) openly, 
although they were candid that judicial independence remains challenging 
for any international judge without the benefit of a lifetime appointment.
5. Conclusions on the ECtHR
The practice of judicial dissent—or, more broadly, of adopting separate 
concurring and dissenting opinions alongside the judgments of the Court—
is manifest in the material, measurable outputs of the ECtHR, where we can 
measure the frequency and character of separate decisions, and also in the 
ideational, intersubjectively shared, and remarkably stable norms that both 
facilitate and set boundaries for the practice. By contrast with many other 
domestic and international courts, the norm of dissent at the ECtHR is high-
ly permissive, with no stigma attached to the practice and indeed with a 
widespread (though not universal) view that judges have a moral obligation 
to state their reasons publicly where they disagree with a majority’s reason-
ing or outcome. Internal norms, or background knowledge, set the bounda-
ries for acceptable behavior in separate opinions, which should be of rea-
sonable length and respectable tone. Finally, Strasbourg judges broadly 
agree that their dissent practices benefitted the Court, strengthening its 
transparency, legitimacy, and legal reasoning while not threatening the 
judges’ precious and admittedly fragile independence. Both the material and 
ideational aspects of this judicial practice are far different at the CJEU, to 
which we now turn.
B. The European Court of Justice
By contrast with the ECtHR, where separate opinions are common, the 
CJEU presents a case of the dog that did not bark, insofar as the Luxem-
bourg judges display a unified face to the world and suppressed any sign of 
internal dissent for more than six decades. 240 From a purely behavioral per-
spective, the ongoing decision by CJEU judges to eschew dissent appears as 
238. Interviews with Judges S1, S2, S3, and S7. 
239. Interviews with Judges S2 and S3.
240. The Court of Justice of the European Union (formerly called the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”)) is the judicial organ of the European Union. As a formal matter, the CJEU is 
the judicial institution of the EU and the European Atomic Energy Community and is made up 
of two courts: the Court of Justice and the General Court (formerly the Court of First In-
stance). For current purposes, our focus is on the Court of Justice.
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a negative finding—a series of zeroes in a spreadsheet of unwritten separate 
opinions. Taking a practice-based approach to the Court, however, encour-
ages us to explore the ideational as well as the material side of what we 
might more positively describe, not as the absence of dissent, but as the 
practice of consensus judicial decision-making. Before proceeding to de-
scribe and analyze this practice, however, we briefly consider the conven-
tional wisdom on this point, which is that the lack of dissent is compelled by 
language in the Court’s Statute.
1. Statute, Procedural Law, and Practice
Our analysis of CJEU dissent practices starts with the 1951 European 
Coal and Steel Community (“ECSC”) Treaty,241 which created the original 
European Court of Justice, and with its first Statute, which set out basic pro-
cedural rules which continue substantially unchanged to this day. The origi-
nal CJEU was designed by the then-six member states primarily as an ad-
ministrative court to consider challenges to the ECSC’s High Authority and, 
as such, was modeled in large part after French administrative courts such 
as the Conseil d’État.242 Article 29 of the ECSC Court’s statute provides that 
the deliberations of the Court shall be and remain secret, and Article 2 of the 
statute includes the secrecy of deliberations as part of the oath of office to 
be sworn by all judges. The Statute was silent on the possibility of issuing 
separate opinions243 and remains so today.244
Many scholars and CJEU judges argue that the obligation to maintain 
the secrecy of deliberations precludes any possibility of dissent. This view is 
summarized by Josef Azizi, a former judge of the General Court, who writes 
that “the full secrecy of deliberations also excludes to reveal the mere num-
ber of judges who have adhered to the final judgment and to specify the rea-
sons why they partly or entirely disagree with that judgment.”245 Several of 
the judges we interviewed expressed similar views.246
We find this reasoning to be less than fully persuasive. The statutes of 
many courts require that deliberations be secret, including many which 
practice both public voting and issue separate opinions. The ICJ Statute, for 
241. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140.
242. See e.g., Anne Boerger-de Smedt, La Cour de Justice dans les Négociations du 
traité de Paris Instituant la CECA, 18 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 7 (2008); Anne Boerger-de
Smedt Negotiating the Foundations of European Law, 1950–57: The Legal History of the 
Treaties of Paris and Rome, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 339 (2012).
243. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, supra note 241, Pro-
tocol on the Code of the Court of Justice, 261 U.N.T.S. at 239.
244. Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union art. 35, 
2010 O.J. 210, 218 (C 83).
245. Josef Azizi, Unveiling the EU Courts’ Internal Decision-Making Process: A Case 
for Dissenting Opinions?, 12 ERA FORUM (SUPPLEMENT 1) 49, 52 (2011). 
246. Interview with Judge L1.
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example, provides in Article 54(3) that “[t]he deliberations of the Court 
shall take place in private and remain secret,”247 and the ECtHR Rules of 
Court similarly provide that “[t]he Court shall deliberate in private. Its de-
liberations shall be and shall remain secret.”248 Judges at both courts find 
this language to be consistent with publication of separate opinions.
For these reasons, the CJEU Statute’s provisions on secret deliberation 
and its silence on the question of dissent cannot be taken to be determinative 
of the Court’s practices or of the tenacity with which the judges persist in 
those practices in a changing world. Once again, both statute and procedural 
law underdetermine judicial practice. Questioned on this point, several 
judges acknowledged that interpreting the treaty to rule out the public re-
lease of either voting results or separate opinions reflects a particular read-
ing of the treaty, informed by the French tradition and by civil law practices 
at the founding of the communities, when none of the original six member 
states allowed or practiced dissent within their domestic courts. To be sure, 
one judge argued, the vast majority of EU member states have since allowed 
separate opinions within their respective constitutional courts, “but our prac-
tice predates that evolution.”249 Another judge agreed, suggesting that the 
interpretation of the secrecy of deliberations to preclude dissent was “close 
to self-evident” in the Europe of the 1950s and that this interpretation per-
sisted for more than six decades, even as a large majority of EU member 
states altered their own domestic practices.250 “The question,” this judge 
asked, “is why haven’t we changed it?”251 Before turning to the judges’ stat-
ed rationale for retaining the practice of non-dissent, let us pause briefly to 
consider its positive counterpart, the Court’s consistent practice of consen-
sus.
2. The Practice of Consensus
Our approach to the CJEU began with an effort to understand how and 
why CJEU judges decided not to issue dissents and how that decision was 
continually reproduced over six decades, even as a growing number of both 
European constitutional courts and international courts moved to embrace 
the practice of writing separately. We were seeking, in short, to understand 
247. ICJ Statute, supra note 74, art. 54, ¶ 3.
248. Rules of Court of the European Court of Human Rights, supra note 193, r. 19. This 
formulation remains virtually unchanged in Rule 22 of the 2018 Rules of Court, which stipu-
late that, “The Court shall deliberate in private. Its deliberations shall remain secret.” Council 
of Europe, Rules of Court (Aug. 1, 2018).
249. Interview with Judge L2. On the introduction and spread of dissent within the civil 
law systems of continental Europe, see, e.g., RAFFAELLI, supra note 191, at 20–29; Kelemen, 
supra note 191, at 1347–51.
250. By 2012, only seven EU members (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Italy, Austria, and Malta) continued to suppress separate opinions in all of their domes-
tic courts. RAFFAELLI, supra note 191, at 30.
251. Interview with Judge L3.
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why the dog had not barked in Luxembourg. To do so, however, we first 
needed to understand the affirmative practice of not barking—or, to put it 
more precisely, the material and ideational practice of consensus decision-
making in CJEU deliberations and opinion-writing.
As a material practice, the CJEU judges issue judgments that speak with 
one magisterial voice, providing no hint of arguments or divisions among its 
judges. Given the diversity of its judges, who hail from 28 different member 
states and from diverse professional backgrounds, this apparent unanimity is 
highly unlikely to have emerged spontaneously. Instead, it reflects a delib-
erate, decades-long practice of consensus decision-making among the judg-
es. A thorough discussion of the judges’ deliberative and opinion-writing 
practices is beyond the scope of this paper.252 Rather, our focus is on the in-
tersubjective understandings that led judges to both strive for internal con-
sensus—albeit not always successfully—and to speak with one voice in 
their judgments.
Again, we start with the Court’s material practices. As at the Strasbourg 
court, most cases before the CJEU are adjudicated primarily before cham-
bers (in Luxembourg, of five judges), with Grand Chamber hearings re-
served for the most important cases. Judges in these chambers generally de-
liberate on the basis of a draft judgment prepared by the Judge Rapporteur, 
in some cases informed also by an Opinion from one of the Court’s Advo-
cates General (about whom more below). These deliberations, and the sub-
sequent efforts by the Judge Rapporteur to prepare judgments reflecting the 
collective deliberations of the chamber, are again secret. Nonetheless, in 
off-the-bench writings and interviews, CJEU judges provide a window into 
the motivations behind and broad characterizations of the consensus style of 
deliberations that ultimately produce a single per curiam decision of the 
Court.
Judge Azizi offers a particularly vivid picture of the culture of consen-
sus in the CJEU and in its first-instance counterpart, the General Court:
EU courts’ chambers act by majority decisions. Even where more 
than superficial divergences have emerged, a judge who would not 
have succeeded in convincing the majority of the chamber would 
not retire from the deliberations like in a snail shell, but would con-
tinue to take part actively in the on-going discussion on the basis of 
the premise of a majority opinion he or she did not agree with 
(“stante concluso”), and contribute, with his or her best efforts, to 
render the final judgment’s argumentation as consistent and con-
vincing as possible. This exercise may be particularly difficult for a 
reporting judge who, although adhering to an adverse minority 
opinion, is expected to serve, with full loyalty, the majority opinion 
252. See generally David Edward, How the Court of Justice Works, 20 EUR. L. REV. 539 
(1995) (describing these practices). 
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and not, like a pouting child, to throw away his or her duty to pre-
pare (elaborate) a finalised judgment.253
In this context, Azizi argues, the introduction of separate opinions 
would substantially undermine the deliberative processes that have long de-
fined the CJEU:
[It] is more than evident that, as soon as the publication of dissent-
ing opinions were admitted, the dissenting judge . . . would leave 
the internal deliberation process and concentrate solely on the elab-
oration of a formal dissenting opinion. Likewise, on their side, the 
other members of the chamber would continue their internal delib-
erations, leaving deliberately the dissenter outside, since he or she 
would, anyhow, be free to present his or her own dissenting opin-
ion. Consequently, the publication of dissenting opinions would 
dramatically impair the unique and unparalleled form of coopera-
tion and cohesion which privileges and characterises the EU courts 
in comparison with many other international courts.254
The CJEU judges we interviewed expressed remarkably similar views 
(minus the references to pouting children). One judge, for example, com-
mented that, “not having dissenting opinions has . . . certain merits because 
we are forced to look for consensus.”255 Another noted that the president of 
any given chamber “is always trying to unify the colleagues, so that each 
can recognize themselves in the judgment,” reflecting the Court’s strong 
culture of consensus.256 A third judge similarly argued that the absence of 
dissent strongly encouraged judges to “look for intermediate solutions” and 
to “integrate legal arguments from either side” in the final decision. The re-
sult, this judge conceded, could occasionally dilute the quality of legal rea-
soning (see below), but, he argued, there is real value in forging a consensus 
among judges representing diverse legal cultures. By contrast, he suggested, 
judges in a system with dissent might abandon the search for consensus 
more readily, knowing that the minority could express their views in a dis-
sent. The result of such a system, he said, was that, “You have the purest 
legal reasoning on either side, and you get the winner by counting heads.” 
But, he concluded, “[t]his is not Europe.”257
Other CJEU judges, however, insisted that the extent of consensus 
among the judges should not be exaggerated. One judge, for example, sug-
gested that, “it is quite frequent that some judges or a judge sitting in a case 
disagrees with at least some of the findings[.] . . . There may not be a formal 
vote but the discussion will often show, for instance in a chamber of five, 
253. Azizi, supra note 245, at 66. 
254. Id.
255. Interview with Judge L2.
256. Interview with Judge L5.
257. Interview with Judge L2. 
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that one or two judges disagree on some point or entirely.”258 A former 
judge agreed, noting that, early in his tenure at the Court, he disagreed 
strongly with one particular ruling to the point where he briefly considered 
resigning from the Court rather than put his name on the majority deci-
sion.259 The point of the Court’s culture of consensus, therefore, is not that a 
consensus is always reached, but that the judges strive for as much consen-
sus as they can muster, and subsequently speak with a single voice to the 
public despite their private reservations on any given point.
3. The Implications of CJEU Consensus Practices
While CJEU judges take pride in the collegial norms that guide deci-
sion-making and opinion-writing at the Court, many of them concede a po-
tential negative consequence, which is the tendency of the Court’s consen-
sus style to produce relatively short, thinly reasoned opinions. As Mitchel 
Lasser has famously noted, “ECJ decisions are rather short, terse, and mag-
isterial decisions that offer condensed factual descriptions, impersonally 
clipped and collegial legal reasoning, and ritualized stylistic forms.”260 Some 
critics of the Court have gone farther, criticizing Court decisions for their 
terse, poor, or even cryptic legal reasoning.261 Former CJEU Judge David 
Edward famously commented that “a disadvantage of the collegiate ap-
proach is that the judgment may simply cloak an inability to reach a clear 
decision. A camel is said to be a horse designed by a committee, and some 
judgments of the Court of Justice are camels.”262
The Court’s stylistic tendencies—which constitute a set of practices of 
their own—date from the Court’s earliest days and remain largely un-
changed, notwithstanding the addition of new member states with very dif-
ferent (e.g., common law) legal traditions. Lasser attributes this literary style 
in part to the influence of the French legal
tradition at the founding of the Court.263 But he and others also 
claim that the Court’s literary style results in large part from the 
practice of issuing per curiam decisions and suppressing public dis-
sent.264
In sharp contrast to the near unanimity we encountered among judges 
and scholars with respect to many other issues, the judges we interviewed 
258. Interview with Judge L3.
259. Interview with Judge L8.
260. MITCHEL LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 104 (2004).
261. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Judicial Après Nice, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE 215, 225 (Gráinne de Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 2001).
262. Edward, supra note 252, at 556–57.
263. LASSER, supra note 260, at 103.
264. Id. at 105.
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were divided on their assessment of both the Court’s literary style and the 
role of consensus practices in producing it. A number of judges conceded 
that the Court’s decisions could be phrased more clearly and sharply and 
observed that the judges’ practice of consensus decision-making tends to 
produce “lowest common denominator” reasoning.265 Notably, however, 
several judges defended the Court’s consensus approach as appropriate for a 
multinational court and suggested that its largely French-inspired drafting 
traditions might continue even if the judges were to move toward a practice 
of issuing separate opinions.266 Still others argued that the Court already 
moved away from the extremely terse style of its early decisions, even while 
retaining its consensus style and implicit ban on dissent.267 Regardless of 
their differences on this issue, Luxembourg judges nearly unanimously 
claim that the norm of consensus, and the de facto ban on dissent, also en-
tails strongly positive consequences for the legitimacy of the Court, the uni-
ty of EU law, and the independence of the judiciary.
Legitimacy. As noted earlier, there is an ongoing debate about the im-
pact of unity versus dissent on the legitimacy of domestic and international 
courts. While some argue that judges enjoy the greatest public legitimacy 
when they speak with a single voice, others, including Strasbourg judges, 
argue that open dissent can enhance a court’s legitimacy by revealing the 
reasoning of all the judges and persuading losing parties that their argu-
ments were taken seriously.
The Luxembourg judges, as well as the vast majority of CJEU scholar-
ship, claim that their practice of speaking with a single, authoritative voice 
has increased the Court’s legitimacy. Indeed, most judges we interviewed 
felt that the CJEU’s legitimacy was secure among national court judges, na-
265. Interview with Judges L1, L3 and L4. In the words of Judge L1: “For the rest it’s
really talking and trying to find reasoning to a judgment that everybody can live with. And 
that of course can have influence on the final outcome, things can be a bit blurred, at least 
that’s what people say from both sides, it’s not clear enough, and it’s a sort of consensual lan-
guage which could have been put sharper, so you don’t do it because you try to get everybody 
on board. But it’s not a bad thing to talk so long that you really feel that everybody can agree 
with the result.” Judge L4 was more blunt: “[T]he fact that there’s no separate opinion means 
that there is a real effort made to get a text that will attract as many votes as possible. So you 
really do water down the text. It’s really the lowest common denominator, very often. You cut 
out paragraphs that one doesn’t want or the other one doesn’t want. And so you may have be-
gun with a text where there was a sort of step-by-step reasoning, and what you end up with is 
a text where you jump a couple of steps, just to please the other judges. . . . So there is colle-
giality in this sense. But the consequences for the quality of the text, and the clarity of the text, 
and the coherence, or the transparency, really, it’s much more difficult for the reader to under-
stand, why was this decision arrived at in this case, and what is its relationship to slightly dif-
ferent cases in the past.”
266. Interview with Judge L1; see also Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the Europe-
an Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 366 (2009) (“It seems possible that, even if sepa-
rate opinions were allowed, judges would not avail themselves of these new opportunities.”).
267. Interview with Judge L2 (“We do better now, without dissent.”).
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tional governments and the broader European public.268 Moreover, nearly all 
of the Luxembourg judges we interviewed expressed concerns that dissents 
could diminish the Court’s legitimacy, which in turn could reduce compli-
ance with CJEU decisions and diminish acceptance of CJEU decisions in 
national courts and public opinion. One CJEU judge pointed out that, as a 
“federal court en devenir,”269 the Court was open to question in ways that 
domestic courts are not, such that a controversial judgment could raise ques-
tions not only about the wisdom of the particular decision, but about the 
Court as a whole.270 Similarly, a move to open dissent might, for example, 
reveal that a controversial decision was narrowly decided by a split vote,271
which might in turn call the legitimacy of the decision or the court into 
question.
Several CJEU judges emphasized relations with national judiciaries. EU 
law, according to one judge, is directly effective in national legal orders, but 
it “percolates,” or filters down, into those orders primarily through national 
courts, which therefore require clear and unambiguous signals from Luxem-
bourg.272 Furthermore, according to one participant with experience in both 
European legal orders, since the CJEU is responsible for interpreting and 
applying detailed economic regulations throughout the Union, it needs to be 
far more concerned about the unity of EU law than the ECtHR, which inter-
prets a smaller number of values-based human rights rules and explicitly al-
lows member states a “margin of appreciation” for their application in na-
tional legal orders. Taken together, several judges argued, these 
considerations increased the importance of sending a single, unified mes-
sage to national judges. Split decisions and minority opinions could send 
national judges mixed signals and undermine the uniform interpretation of 
EU law in member states.273
Independence. Many scholars argue that Luxembourg judges adopted 
the practice of consensus decisions primarily to compensate for their short, 
six-year, renewable terms and specifically to prevent their home govern-
ments from identifying and punishing (by failing to reappoint) the judges 
268. See, e.g., JUDGING EUROPE’S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2013).
269. Interview with Judge L4.
270. Interview with Judge L2.
271. The concern is not merely hypothetical. See, e.g., Morten Rasmussen, Revolutioniz-
ing European Law: A History of the Van Gend en Loos Judgment, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 136, 
154 (2014) (revealing that iconic case was decided by a 4-3 vote).
272. Interview with Judge L4.
273. “The national courts are asking us questions about interpretation. I mean, already 
now there are quite some difficulties for us to explain to the national judges how EU law 
should be interpreted. . . . And then of course you could wonder what messages are you send-
ing out if you said, okay, this is how the majority sees it but there are four other judges who 
have other views. I think then the national court will be completely lost.” Interview with 
Judge L1.
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for individual positions on sensitive issues.274 Former judges have also 
commented, in some cases very candidly, about the fragility of judicial in-
dependence, the dangers of short, renewable terms, and the practice of issu-
ing per curiam rulings as a potential defense against external pressures on 
the Luxembourg judges. The most extensive discussion comes from Judge 
Azizi, who suggests that “the very fact that judges may be reappointed 
could be seen as putting at risk their independence.”275 He continues:
Seen from this angle, the obligation to keep the secrecy of delibera-
tions is simply an appropriate means to guarantee judicial inde-
pendence. . . . In all these types of proceedings, the possibility of 
making known the position of a judge . . . could put him or her un-
der pressure to change his or her attitude in order to be in line with 
his or her Member State or with the public opinion prevailing in his 
or her Member State. In this respect, the relevant question is not so 
much as to whether or not a judge would be strong enough to resist 
such potential pressures[.] . . . [What is] relevant is only that the 
mere taint of the external appearance or even likelihood to meet 
such expectations could not be ruled out[.]276
Nearly all the judges we interviewed expressed similar sentiments. One 
judge raised the issue particularly pointedly: “If you are nominated for six 
years and you are just at the end of your term and you want to be reappoint-
ed and you are dependent on your government—eh?”277 Other judges noted 
that, if dissents were allowed, judges might feel pressure to dissent on cases 
of importance to their home states. Avoiding these potential conflicts of in-
terest was accordingly a major, although not the only, reason cited by the 
judges for avoiding public dissent.
Interestingly, several judges indicated that they and their fellow judges 
discussed ways in which their mandates could be made compatible with is-
suing separate opinions. Several judges mentioned the strategy—pursued at 
274. See, e.g., DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 145 (2d ed. 2010) (“Fears have been expressed that the ability to renew the term 
of office might compromise the independence of the judges. . . . In practice, this has not posed 
a problem, because the Court works under the principle of collegiality, in which a single 
judgment is given.”); Weiler, supra note 261, at 225–26 (arguing for the introduction of dis-
senting opinions in the Court, but noting that a “precondition” to any such reform would be 
for the member states to renewable judicial terms, “a continuous affront to the integrity of the 
European legal system”); J.H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Judging the Judges: Apology and Critique
to JUDGING EUROPE’S JUDGES, supra note 268, at 252 (calling for the introduction of dissent-
ing opinions, but noting that, “[s]o long . . . as the judges may be reappointed the possibility of 
dissenting opinions would be inimical.”).
275. Azizi, supra note 245, at 55.
276. Id. at 55–56; see also G. Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and 
the European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REV. 175, 176 (1994) (“[I]n few countries is the 
judiciary so bereft of formal guarantees of its independence.”).
277. Interviews with Judges L1, L2 and L3. 
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the German Constitutional Court and at the ECtHR—of shifting from rela-
tively short, renewable terms to longer, non-renewable terms.278 In their re-
port to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference that culminated in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, the Court expressed an interest in moving toward longer, 
non-renewable judicial terms of office, a reform that it justified explicitly in 
terms of judicial independence.279 The European Parliament, the Spanish 
government, and a number of non-state actors advanced similar proposals,280
but the Conference made no changes in this regard. Hence, CJEU judges 
face an unchanged, six-year renewable mandate, and with it a strong incen-
tive to avoid public dissent in the interests of preserving independence.
The Role of the Advocate General. Finally, one should not leave the 
question of judicial dissent at the CJEU without mentioning the office and 
the contribution of the Advocate General (“AG”), who, in most cases, pre-
pares a detailed preliminary opinion for the chamber, which is free to follow 
or to depart from the AG’s decision.281 The judges we interviewed, as well 
as Judge Azizi in his off-the-bench writing, suggest that the AG opinion can 
function as a substitute—albeit an imperfect one—for separate concurring 
or dissenting opinions.
On the one hand, several judges noted that the AG Opinion often pro-
vides richer and more detailed arguments than the Court’s typically shorter 
and more terse decisions. Furthermore, in those cases in which the Court 
departs in whole or in part from the AG’s views, that difference provides a 
sense of the other jurisprudential roads the Court might have taken.282 These 
are, indeed, some of the functions of separate concurring or dissenting opin-
ions. Nevertheless, several of the judges we interviewed pointed to the lim-
its of the AG Opinion as a substitute for dissent. Unlike dissenting or con-
curring opinions in judicial rulings, the AG Opinion is formulated prior to 
judicial deliberation, meaning that it informs, but is not informed by, that 
deliberation.283 Furthermore, the value of the AG Opinion in clarifying the 
alternative paths the court might have taken is limited to the minority of 
cases in which the Court breaks with the AG’s Opinion. In the large majori-
ty of cases where the Court agrees with the AG Opinion, the public sees no 
hint of possible alternatives.284
278. Interviews with Judges L2, L3 and L5.
279. European Court of Justice, Report of the Court of Justice on Certain Aspects of the 
Application of the Treaty on European Union, at 6–7 (May 14, 1995). 
280. See European Parliament, Intergovernmental Conference Briefing No. 1: The Court 
of Justice, §§ 3–6 (1997), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/fiches/fiche1_en.htm. 
281. For more on this office, see generally NOREEN BURROWS & ROSA GREAVES, THE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL AND EC LAW (2007).
282. Interview with Judge L2; see also Azizi, supra note 245, at 63.
283. Interview with Judge L2.
284. Interview with Judge L3.
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4. Conclusions on the CJEU
The practice of non-dissent—or, more positively, the practice of con-
sensus-based deliberation and decision-making—is well established at the 
CJEU, externally reflected in the Court’s magisterial unity toward the out-
side world and internally reproduced by judicial practices of collective de-
liberation and compromise. These practices, moreover, appear to be em-
braced and defended by judges from both civil and common law back-
backgrounds. Our expectation upon undertaking this research was that civil 
law judges would be more comfortable with the CJEU’s consensus culture, 
while common law judges might chafe at being unable to express their indi-
vidual views publicly.285 Our hypothesis was initially supported, as we 
found that judges with a civil law background tended to indicate that the 
norms in Luxembourg felt natural,286 while those from common law back-
grounds287 and from post-socialist judiciaries in central and eastern Europe288
found the lack of opportunity to express their individual opinions jarring at 
first. Without exception, however, the judges we interviewed indicated that 
they—like the judges at the ECtHR—rapidly acclimated to the norms of the 
Court and came to support them with time.
C. Comparing Practices in Strasbourg and Luxembourg
Our discussion of dissent practices at the European courts has been nec-
essarily abbreviated, focusing only on several core questions and leaving 
out related practices.289 Nevertheless, it is possible to highlight a few salient 
points.
First, and significantly, a practice-oriented approach to opinion-writing 
practices at both courts reveals that the obvious differences between the two 
courts are not simply behavioral—namely, that the Strasbourg judges issue 
public, separate opinions, and the Luxembourg judges do not—but also 
normative and ideational. Judges at both courts have carefully considered 
the impact of their dissent practices on important values, such as judicial le-
gitimacy and judicial independence, and have crafted their practices accord-
ingly. These different practices are also reproduced over time through a 
combination of formal rules and informal norms into which new judges are 
socialized.
285. See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 
122 (3d ed. 2007).
286. Interview with Judge L1. 
287. Interview with Judge L6.
288. Interview with Judge L5.
289. To take just one example, judges at both courts volunteered details about their rela-
tions with and dependence on the courts’ registries and clerks (référendaires), with Strasbourg 
judges enjoying both less support and less control over the choice of their clerks than their 
Luxembourg counterparts. 
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Second, we found that both the material and ideational practices of dis-
sent were highly stable over time. Drawing on writings detailing shifts in 
dissent practices at the U.S. Supreme Court over time, we formulated what 
one might call a “life cycle” hypothesis. Namely, we theorized that the im-
perative of judicial unity—and its purported legitimacy benefits vis-à-vis 
the political branches and general public—are greatest early in the life of 
any court as the new institution struggles to establish its place and legitima-
cy in the constitutional order. By contrast, a more mature court that has es-
tablished its place and legitimacy might be more able to afford public dis-
plays of disunity through dissents. Hence, we hypothesized that judges 
might move toward greater acceptance of dissents over a given court’s life 
cycle. However, we found few if any signs of a life cycle at either of the Eu-
ropean courts, but rather a remarkable stability of both material behaviors 
and intersubjectively shared norms at each court over time. It is as if, as one 
participant with experience at both courts suggested, the two courts entered 
separate tunnels six decades ago and remain in those tunnels today.290
Third and finally, practices of dissent and non-dissent are intertwined 
with other practices at the two courts, including practices of judicial ap-
pointment as well as deliberation and opinion-writing. Thus, while we have 
bracketed a particular set of practices for the purposes of this study, the 
practice of dissent does not stand alone, but rather takes its place in the con-
stellation of practices that characterize any given court.
Conclusion
To date, both legal and political science scholars have largely treated in-
ternational courts as the unit of analysis. In this paper, we argue for a meth-
odological and epistemological shift in research on international courts and 
for the importance of opening up the black box of the courts to study what 
judges do and how they do it. Practice theory provides a useful conceptual 
framework for engaging in this activity. Applying one strand of practice 
theory, we identified and created a typology of a wide variety of interna-
tional judicial practices; analyzed the striking variation among practices at 
different international courts; and began a comparative exploration of a sin-
gle practice—international judicial dissent—across a handful of courts.
Our work here, however, is only a first effort at exploring the large uni-
verse of international judicial practices, and we therefore conclude simply 
by highlighting future research opportunities along three dimensions. First, 
there is much work to be done in expanding the scope of inquiry beyond 
that found in this paper. One way to do so is by examining courts beyond 
the illustrative handful analyzed in this paper, especially less-studied courts 
such as regional courts outside of Europe and hybrid tribunals, as well as 
court-like bodies such as the various UN human rights bodies and arbitral 
290. Interview with participant. 
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tribunals. Another way is to expand the number and type of judicial practic-
es under scrutiny, since we are well aware that our list of practices is illus-
trative rather than complete.
Second, the presentation of international judicial practices in this pa-
per—perhaps reflecting a strong tendency in the literature on practices—
emphasizes continuity and stability of international judicial practices. In 
Part IV, for example, we noted the remarkable persistence of practices of 
dissent at the two European courts, and many other practices are similarly 
reproduced over years and decades, passed from one generation of judges to 
the next with little or no significant change. Other strands of the practice lit-
erature, however, problematize questions of continuity and change, noting 
that what we sometimes consider to be stable structures can fall into desue-
tude if not reproduced in practice and finding the possibility of change im-
manent in the interplay of practitioners exercising their agency within, and 
upon, existing practices. This approach begs the question of how, and why, 
practices change over time. Thus, a second frontier of research would ex-
plore issues of continuity and change over time—of inheritance and adapta-
tion, or habit and innovation—in international judicial practices.
Third and finally, future scholars would do well to devote particular at-
tention to the consequences of judicial practices. By way of example, this 
paper outlined several consequences of different opinion-writing practices 
for judicial independence, legitimacy, collegiality, and the quality of the 
law, although we caution that these findings are tentative. We believe, with 
the majority of practice theorists, that everyday practices, including those of 
international judges, are both understudied and worth studying in their own 
right. At the end of the day, however, drawing connections between specific 
practices and outcomes may produce the most important payoff for scholars 
seeking to understand the role of courts and judges in the international legal 
order.
